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Finding International Law:
Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources
Harlan Grant Cohen*
ABSTRACT: The doctrine of sources has served international law well over
the past century, providing structure and coherence during a time when
international law was expanding rapidly and dramatically. But the
doctrine's explanatory power is increasingly being challenged. Current
doctrine tells us that treaties are international law; empirical evidence,
however, suggests that treaties are poor predictors of state practice. The
expansion of the international community, the rise of human rights,
developments in international legal theory, and the international system's
need to adapt to changing circumstances have also put pressure on the
reified role of "treaty" in identifying rules of international law.
Drawing from a number of theories developed to explain why states comply
with international law, this Article proposes a new doctrine of sources
focused on opinio juris and how norms come to be accepted as
international law. Rather than taking for granted that a treaty reflects
international law, the rules laid out in a treaty would themselves be judged
by the internalized norms supporting them, either (a) in the strength and
legitimacy of the process that led to the adoption of those rules or (b) in the
customary acceptance of the rule itself This Article argues that such a
revised doctrine of sources will better capture which rules are actually treated
as law in the international system, blunting skepticism about international
law and placing international law on firmerfooting.
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INTRODUCTION
International law is plagued by two deeply held, apparently
incompatible intuitions. The first, to which international law skeptics often
appeal, is that international laws are regularly broken. This intuition seems to
be supported by a long list of well-known, high-profile treaty violations. Both
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and NATO intervention in Kosovo proceeded
without the Security Council authorization required by the U.N. Charter.
Prisoners captured by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan (as well as
elsewhere) have suffered abuse despite clear treaties prohibiting their
mistreatment. And most of all, states like Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan,
and Zimbabwe continue to violate the human and civil rights of their
citizens in direct contravention of the human rights treaties they have
signed. International law skeptics see these violations as proof of
international law's relative inefficacy.' In their view, international law exerts
little independent influence over state action.2 For some, the patterns of
noncompliance are proof that international law is "law" in name only.
Recent empirical work also seems to support this intuition. Skeptics of
international law point to studies that seem to show little or no correlation
between signing human rights treaties and better human rights practices.3
One recent study seems to go even further, presenting empirical evidence
that those states most likely to ratify human rights or environmental treaties
may also be those least likely to follow them. According to this study, states
with strong commitments to human rights and strong internal actors (e.g.,
courts and NGOs) may be less likely to ratify a treaty-even if it requires
actions the state already follows-because it is far more likely that those
actors will require the state to comply. At the same time, states with weak
internal actors may ratify those treaties because they are unlikely to be held
to their provisions after receiving the initial public-relations benefit of
ratification.4 Such findings, which drives a wedge between the rules
identified as international law and the actual practice of states, provide
powerful fodder for those who believe that international law is meaningless.
Yet this first intuition somehow coexists with a second, equally powerful
intuition that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."
5
1. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 225 (2005)
("International law is a real phenomenon, but international scholars exaggerate its power and
significance.").
2. Id. at 108 (concluding that "modem multilateral human rights treaties have little
exogenous influence on state behavior").
3. Id. at 121 (finding "no evidence that ratification of human rights treaties affects
human rights practices").
4. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law,
72 U. CHI. L. REX'. 469, 515 (2005) [hereinafter Hathaway, An Integrated Theory].
5. LoUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979).
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Louis Henkin's famous statement is repeated almost as a mantra by many
international law scholars,6 and it clearly drives their work.' Proponents of
this view downplay the high-profile violations cited by international law
skeptics. Those violations are the exception rather than the rule; regular
compliance with the rules-wars not fought, rights not violated-is simply
harder to observe. Moreover, where the skeptics see proof that international
law is mere illusion, international law optimists see compliance problems
that can be understood and fixed.
These international law optimists instead point to the growing network
of trade and investment treaties and the myriad humdrum ways
international law regulates modern global life. A list of "International Law:
100 Ways It Shapes Our Lives," prepared by the American Society of
International Law for its 100th anniversary, demonstrates this ethos. The
items included on the list demonstrate how ordinary compliance with
international law has become. The list includes "[a]lways knowing what the
date and time is anywhere on the planet," "[m]ailing a letter reliably and
easily to anyone in the world," "[d]riving freely and legally in another
country," "[p]reventing your income, should you earn any in a foreign
country, from being taxed twice," and "[e] nforcing an arbitral award without
6. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581,
602 (2005) ("Substantial numbers of scholars have seconded Henkin's claim."). Examples
abound. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1110, 1121 (1982) (quoting HENKIN, supra note 5, at 47); Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory
and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH.J. INT'L L.
143, 155 (2001) (same); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1823, 1842 n.79 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory] (same);
Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 475-76 (2003)
(same).
7. Harold Koh uses the statement to frame his transnational legal process theory. See
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L.
REv. 623, 632 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home] ("In Professor
Henkin's famous phrase, 'almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.' But if this is so, why do they obey?");
Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1411
(1999) [hereinafter Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?] ("I merely suggest
viewing human rights enforcement through vertical, 'transnational legal process' lenses can
help explain why in Louis Henkin's famous phrase, 'almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law almost all of the time.'"). Thomas Franck frames his theory this
way, though without actually quoting Henkin. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International
System, 82 AM.J. INT'L L. 705, 705 (1988) [hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy] ("This observation is
made not to register optimism that the half-empty glass is also half full, but to draw attention to
a pregnant phenomenon: that most states observe systemic rules much of the time in their
relations with other states.").
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a local court having to hear the dispute anew."" All of these result from the
regularized operation of international agreements. 9
International actors and international law scholars have often chosen
sides in this debate, preferring one intuition over the other. Proponents of
the Bush Doctrine and its unilateralism find support in the first intuition;
advocates of the International Criminal Court take solace in the second.
Tension between these two intuitions remains a powerful driving force
behind international law and practice. In general, however, the two sides
end up arguing past each other, and battles between the two intuitions and
their proponents end in stalemate-neither side is able to convince the
other to abandon its deeply held beliefs.
This Article suggests a way to reconcile these two intuitions, a way to
conceive of international law that takes both intuitions seriously. There are a
few ways one could conceptualize the gaps between the dictates of treaties
and actual state practice. One way would be to accept that treaties are
international law but recognize that some of those laws are often violated. A
second way would be to suggest that there is no such thing as international
law and that widespread violation proves the point. Finally, a third way would
question our method for identifying international law-in other words, it
would suggest that there is international law, but treaties are not necessarily
it. This Article takes the third approach and suggests a revision, or at least
rethinking, of the traditional doctrine of sources. Rather than treat the
apparent gaps between treaties and compliance as evidence of international
law's inefficacy or as proof that international law is a myth, this Article
argues for a rethinking of what the rules of international law actually are.
In searching for a rule of international law, sources have traditionally
been arranged in a rough hierarchy of: (1) treaties, (2) custom, and (3)
general principles of law and equity. Treaties are generally treated as the
best and strongest source of international law rules. To a certain extent,
treaties and international law are often treated as one and the same. Custom
and general principles act as sources of international law in the absence of a
treaty. This hierarchy emphasizes a positivist concern with state consent over
the internalization of norms. It prefers the formality and definition of
treaties over less tangible sources of law.
But what if treaties are not, in and of themselves, the law? This Article
argues that the traditional doctrine of sources-with its focus on consent
and formality and its idolization of treaties-is outdated and needs to be
revised. The doctrine was designed to describe a late-nineteenth-century
8. International Law: 100 Ways It Shapes Our Lives, http://www.
asil.org/centennial/100/ways.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
9. See id. (citing the international agreement at the International Meridian Conference
in 1884, the 1964 Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, the 1949 U.N. Convention on
International Road Traffic, various bilateral double-taxation agreements, and the 1958 U.N.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards).
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world. Its hierarchy of treaties, custom, and general principles did a
reasonable job of identifying the rules treated as law in an international
system made up of few states and in which treaties reflected attempts at state
coordination. But changes in the international system since that time-the
rapid inclusion of new states into the system, the rise of human rights, the
creation of international and transnational bodies, and the resultant
changes in the nature and subject-matter of treaties-have put great strain
on the doctrine. Largely unchanged, the doctrine has struggled to identify
and categorize modern international phenomena. The result, this Article
argues, is a disconnect between the rules identified as law by the doctrine of
sources and the rules actually treated as law by the actors in the
international system. Our warring intuitions about international law are just
one manifestation of the confusion this disconnect produces.
This Article seeks to bridge this divide, to realign our method for
identifying the rules considered international "law," namely the doctrine of
sources, with the rules actually treated as law by international actors. To do
so, this Article seeks guidance from a different and currently vibrant area of
international legal theory: recent explanations of when and why states
comply with international law.'0 Whereas the doctrine of sources remains
tethered to positivist concerns with state consent and formality, a number of
these theories have sought to explain how international law works by
focusing on processes of norm internalization and legitimization." These
theories attempt to explain how international law rules come to exert their
force and, as such, can provide hints as to which rules will be treated as "law"
by international actors.
Drawing on these theories, this Article suggests that a more accurate
picture of international law would de-emphasize a rule's form-treaty,
10. This is one of the most active areas of current international law scholarship. See
generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995) (proposing a "managerial" model of
compliance that relies on repeated dialogues and interactions between states over rules);
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, AcrlivsTs BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (describing the rise and influence of activist networks that
operate across national frontiers); Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7 (arguing that state
compliance with international law results from perceived legitimacy of particular rules); Ryan
Goodman & Derekinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,
54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, Socialization and International Human
Rights Law] (suggesting that some state compliance may be best explained by acculturation or
socialization rather than coercion or persuasion); Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra
note 6 (designing a reputation-based model of state compliance with international law);
Hathaway, An Integrated Theory, supra note 4 (arguing that state commitment and compliance to
treaties are a function of transnational and domestic enforcement and collateral
consequences); Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7 (suggesting that states'
compliance with international law results from its rules internalization into domestic legal
systems); Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra note 7 (same).
11. See infra Part III.A (describing these theories).
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custom, or something else-in favor of opiniojuris the traditional element of
customary international law requiring belief that a rule is a legal
obligation. A new doctrine of sources would focus on the processes by
which rules come to be internalized by international actors. Rather than
taking for granted that a treaty reflects international law, the rules laid out
in a treaty would themselves be judged by the internalized norms supporting
them, either in (1) the strength and legitimacy of the process that led to the
adoption of those rules or (2) the customary acceptance of the rule itself.
The presence of a treaty would merely be evidence of a rule of international
law requiring deeper analysis.
Shifting our focus to how norms come to be accepted as international
law, we can begin to construct a new hierarchy of sources built on how
deeply different norms are internalized in the international system. This new
hierarchy would be made up of roughly three groups of sources: (1) Core
International Law, (2) Legitimated Rules, and (3) Aspirational International
Law-each carrying more force as law than the next.
The first group, Core International Law, would include the most basic
and accepted norms of international law. These norms can be divided into
two basic types. The first, Internalized Norms, are deeply internalized, widely
accepted, substantive international norms, like jus cogens prohibitions on
piracy, slavery, and genocide. The second, Process Values, are deeply
internalized understandings of the processes and qualities that make
particular rules binding. Such Process Values might include qualities like the
determinacy, consistency, and pedigree of agreed-upon rules, as well as the
clarity of agreed-upon enforcement mechanisms. Where these qualities are
present, the "law" quality of the rules with which they are associated will be
more widely accepted.
The second group within the new hierarchy, Legitimated Rules, would
build upon this base and include those treaties and customary rules of
international law backed by strong Process Values. Treaties and custom
falling in this category would constitute binding international law because of
the legitimacy of the process underlying them.
Finally, the third group, Aspirational International Law, would include
those rules described in treaties that have not yet been internalized as
substantive norms of the system and that are not backed by strong Process
Values. Rules falling in this category might represent the aspirations of the
international system and might have considerable moral or political force.
They would not, however, have full status as "law."
12. In order to find customary international law, one must find both custom-that states
act this way-and evidence of opiniojuris--that states follow the rule because they believe they
are legally required to do so, not simply because it is pragmatic. Notably, evidence of opiniojuris
can be established by the violation of the rule, if the violating state makes efforts to justify its
actions rather than simply acting.
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All three of these groups would exist along a continuum. They would
not be static categories but rather snapshots of international law at a given
time. A rule that today falls within Aspirational International Law might over
time be internalized by international actors; the treaty that includes that rule
may gain pedigree and legitimacy through the passage of time. All of
international law, including both treaties and customary international law,
would exist as part of one dynamic phenomenon of rule legitimization and
internalization.
Once the presumption that treaties are authoritative statements of
international law is stripped away, we can begin to see how both intuitions
about international law can be true. A great deal of international law is
followed regularly, but it is not necessarily that described by treaties. Certain
high-profile treaties may be regularly violated, but those treaties may not yet
constitute international "law." The revised doctrine of sources described
here helps distinguish between those rules that are international "laws" and
those that are mere aspirational statements, and between those actions that
violate international law and those that are taken in the absence of it.
Two important points should be made about what this new doctrine of
sources would not do. First, the new doctrine described here does not seek
to equate law with compliance or to eliminate instances of non-compliance.
The quality this doctrine seeks to identify, whether a rule is treated as law, is
significantly distinct from whether a rule is complied with. Even where a rule
is understood as a legal obligation, where violations are seen as legal
breaches to be avoided, and where sanctions are seen as legitimate responses
to violation, an actor may choose not to follow the rule." Although many
people choose to speed, they likely still recognize the speed limit's status as
law and would likely accept a ticket as a valid punishment. A revision of the
doctrine of sources should eliminate some of the stranger, harder-to-explain
patterns of non-compliance, but as in any legal system, instances of non-
compliance will remain.
Second, the goal of this alternative doctrine of sources is to better
identify the rules currently treated as law by international actors. Although
adopting such a doctrine is a desirable improvement over our current
system, the new doctrine is not meant to provide the "best" or most desirable
vision of what international law could be.
Despite these caveats, this project is much more than just a semantic
exercise. At the theoretical level, the revised doctrine would bring treaties
and custom into a single theory, would draw the increasingly anachronistic
and theoretically orphaned doctrine of sources into current trends in
international legal theory, and would begin to provide answers to
13. They may, for example, find the consequences of compliance more dangerous than
violation. Such a calculation may be particularly likely in situations involving national security.
See Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 6, at 1883-86.
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longstanding problems like the status of human rights declarations, the
possibility of instant custom, and the difficulty of change in treaty regimes.
At a practical level, the revised doctrine should have a positive effect on
state practice, helping to put international law on stronger footing and
enhancing its authority as a guide to state action. The apparent gaps
between the rules identified as law by the current doctrine of sources and
the rules actually treated as law by states fuel skepticism about international
law more generally. Such skepticism saps international law of its strength
and authority, providing too easy an excuse for states to violate its rules. By
focusing more closely on opinio juris, the revised doctrine of sources
suggested here should better capture which rules are actually treated as law
in the international system and, thus, serve as a more credible, harder-to-
dodge guide of which actions will be perceived to violate international law,
will be worthy of rebuke by the other states, and may legitimately be met
with sanctions. The revised doctrine should help tear down the distinction
between the "law on the books" and the law that matters.
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first two parts look at how we
came to accept our current sources orthodoxy and why it may no longer be
accurate. Part I provides some background on the doctrine of sources. It
looks at the traditional role played by custom, opiniojuris, and treaties in the
identification of rules of international law. It also looks at how the relative
importance of various sources has changed over time. The Part explains how
earlier international law scholars viewed the sources of international law, as
well as the greater weight they placed on custom. It then describes the rise of
modern positivist theories of international law in the nineteenth century
and how they led to the primacy of treaties among sources.
Part II presents some present-day challenges to the positivist hierarchy
of sources. Part II.A explains how the rapid increase in the number of states
in the international system over the last one hundred years, combined with a
shift in emphasis from treaties concerned with state coordination to those
concerned with human rights and the internal affairs of states, have
transformed the nature of treaty-making. Part II.B examines how courts and
theorists have dealt with new sources-in particular, U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions-that are not treaties, but that nonetheless indicate some
weaker consensus on international issues. The Section will consider how
those sources have been used as "evidence" of customary international law
and the "crystallization" of legal rules. Part II.C ponders the question of
desuetude and how treaties can or should change when faced with changing
circumstances. Finally, Part II.D looks at the challenges posed by recent
studies indicating that the states least likely to follow certain treaties may be
the same states most likely to sign them.
Parts III and IV develop a new doctrine of sources. Part III looks for
inspiration in a number of theories designed to explain when and why states
do comply with international law. In particular, it explores two such
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theories, (1) Harold Koh's theory of transnational legal process and normS 14
internalization and (2) Thomas Franck's theory of international law as
legitimacy, 15 in hopes of understanding how and when international rules
come to be seen as law. Part IV introduces a new doctrine of sources. It
explains how theories of norm internalization and legitimacy discussed in
Part III, originally conceived as theories of why states obey international law,
can be used to construct a theory of what international law is and how
international law can be identified. It lays out a specific new hierarchy of
sources that emphasizes norm internalization and opinio juris. Part IV
concludes by considering how such a new doctrine would work in practice,
exploring the effect such a new doctrine would have on (1) international
legal theory, (2) international dispute resolution, (3) the direction of state
action, and (4) the legislation of new international rights.
I. THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Much of our day-to-day understanding and discussion16 of international
law rests on assumptions provided by the doctrine of sources. The doctrine
is both more and less than an instruction manual on how to find rules of
international law. Instead, it is a general understanding of how and where
international law rules can be found, a methodology for identifying valid
rules of international law, and a theory of international law's bases.'7 As
explained in Part I.A., this understanding has generally emphasized sources
demonstrating state consent. However, as Part I.B. will explain, this
preference is neither timeless nor inherently obvious. Instead, the accepted
wisdom of the modern doctrine of sources is a product of historical trends
converging in the nineteenth century.
A. THE MODERNADOCTRINE OF SOURCES
Discussion of the sources of international law often starts with Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). 18 Under
the statute:
14. See generally Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7; Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey?].
15. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995) [hereinafter FRANCK, FAIRNESS]; THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACYAMONG
NATIONS (1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY]; Franck, Legitimacy, supra
note 7.
16. Whether practice also rests on assumptions provided by the doctrine of sources will be
considered infra in Part II.D.
17. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, The Doctrine of Sources and the Inductive Science of Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 35, 35-37 (1991).
18. Notably, many international law textbooks begin their discussion in exactly this way.
See, e.g., LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 56-57 (4th ed.
2001); MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 20-21
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(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of general practice
accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of international law. 9
The first two sources listed are generally accepted as the two main sources of
international law. ° The first, international conventions, refers to treaties,
both multilateral and bilateral. The second, "international custom, as
evidence of general practice accepted as law,"21 refers to customary
international law. As the definition in the statute implies, customary
international law requires two elements: (1) the general practice of states
and (2) evidence that the practice arises out of a sense of legal obligation,
rather than coincidence or self-interest.22 This second, "psychological"
element is known as opinio juris and has been commonly found in the
statements of state officials.
(2d Ed. 2001) [hereinafter JANIS & NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW] ("An ordinary starting point
for international lawyers from most any part of the globe when thinking about the formal
sources of international law is Article 38 of the International Court of Justice."); HENRY J.
STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 232 (4th ed. 1994)
(quoting the statute and commenting that "[t]his list has significance not only for tribunals but
also for officials or scholars pursuing the inquiries described above").
19. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, 1,June 26, 1945, 59 Star. 1055,
1060, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter International Court ofJustice Statute].
20. See, e.g., I LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 1912) ("Thus custom and
treaties are the two exclusive sources of the Law of Nations."); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 534 (1993) ("The principal traditional sources of
international law are treaties and custom, supplemented by general principles of law."); John K.
Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 715, 716 (2005) ("Treaty
and custom are generally identified as the most prominent sources of international law.").
21. International Court of Justice Statute, supra note 19, art. 38.
22. "International jurists speak of a custom, when a clear and continuous habit of doing
certain actions has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are legally
necessary or legally right." OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 22. "Whenever and as soon as a certain
frequently adopted international conduct of States is considered legally necessary or legally
right, the rule, which may be abstracted form such conduct, is a rule of customary International
Law." Id. at 23.
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In many ways, the two main sources are a study in contrasts; the relative
strengths of one are the weaknesses of the other. Treaties, because they are
written, have the advantage of definition and certainty. This definition
extends to the interpretation of treaties as well; although treaty
interpretation is still influenced by customary international law principles, its
general rules have been codified and agreed to in a treaty. Treaties also
carry a perceived legitimacy that comes from being negotiated. At the same
time, however, the law-making authority of treaties is limited. The vast
majority of treaties are between relatively few states, and treaties establish law
24
only between their parties. Treaties establish universal international law
only when they have been universally ratified. Treaties also have the
disadvantage of rigidity; once ratified, it becomes very difficult to change the
rules. 25 Treaties can thus seem anachronistic as the circumstances that led to
26their negotiation melt away.
Custom, by contrast, is difficult to identify, but highly fluid. Evidence of
consistent state practice is often elusive; what evidence there is is often open
to various interpretations. The same can be said of the more ephemeral
apiniojuris. Identifying a rule of customary international law requires careful
sifting through sometimes limited, sometimes voluminous, often
contradictory evidence of state practice and opiniojuris. Disagreements over
rules are not uncommon. Accordingly, when courts do apply customary
international law, as they still commonly do,27 they open themselves to
criticism that they have misidentified the rule, weighed state practice
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into forceJan. 27, 1980).
24. See DAMROScH ET AL., supra note 18, at 110 ("A third category of treaties-by far the
largest in number-includes bilateral agreements and, for some purposes, agreements by three
or four states."); see also U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, TREATY SEcTION, TREATY HANDBOOK §
5.5.2 (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ola-internet/Assistance/handbook eng/
hbframeset.htm ("The majority of treaties registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations are bilateral treaties.").
25. Of course, treaties can designate their own procedures for more rapid amendment, as
some environmental treaties have done. For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 2, 9(c), 10(b), Sept. 19, 1987, S. TREATYDoC. No. 100-10, 1522
U.N.T.S. 33, allows the Meeting of the Parties ("MOP"), operating by two-thirds majority vote,
to modify the Protocol's regulatory requirements. See Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative
Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 90 (2005). Another
example is the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, which establishes
a process for the regular recommendation and adoption of new measures and policies by the
treaty parties. See generally Christopher C. Joyner, Recommended Measures Under the Antarctic Treaty:
Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law, 19 MICH.J. INT'L L. 401 (1998).
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-38 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 91 (June 27).
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incorrectly, or overstated the presence of opinio juris.2" Moreover, changing
sources of international law, including U.N. declarations and unsigned
treaties, have been thrown into the customary international law mix;
although they are commonly used as evidence of custom,29 what role these
sources should play remains highly controversial.0 Custom does have the
advantage of allowing for change, although some argue that custom changes
too quickly (arguing that courts cherry-pick evidence of practice and opinio
juis to reach desired results) and others argue that it changes too slowly
(because of the requirement of changed general practice).3 ' One ever-
present problem is that the same behavior can constitute either a violation
of the customary rule or evidence of a new rule. Similarly, a statement that
overstates the rule, although inaccurate, may move the rule in that direction.
"Ought" and "is" are inextricably intertwined.
Although the ICJ statute does not specify any greater weight to be given
to one source or another, the order in which the sources are listed has often
been understood as a rough hierarchy-treaties are often considered first
32
and treated as most authoritative. Moreover, some of the contrasts between
28. See, e.g., Anthony A. D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
101, 101 (1987) (criticizing Nicar. v. US.); Dean Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 11
GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311, 311 (1981) (criticizing Filartiga); Arthur A. Weisburd, Customary
International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 26-29 (1988) (criticizing
Filartiga).
29. See, e.g., Igartua-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 176 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The
ICCPR, the UDHR, the American Declaration, the ACHR and the IADC are all evidence of the
emergence of a norm of customary international law with an independent and binding juridical
status."); Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597-98 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
30. For example, see the debate between Arthur Weisburd and Anthony D'Amato. See
generally Weisburd, supra note 28; Anthony A. D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor
Arthur A. Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988); Arthur A. Weisburd, A Reply to
Professor Anthony A. D'Amato, 21 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 473 (1988); Anthony A. D'Amato, A Brief
Rejoinder, 21 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489 (1988).
31. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 757, 762 (2001).
32. DAMROSCHt ET AL., supra note 18, at 108 ("Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court, in its list of sources according to which disputes are to be decided, gives first place to
'international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contracting States.'"); JANIS & NOYEs, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at
22 ("Partly because 'international conventions' are listed first in Article 38(1), the judges of the
ICJ and other international lawyers have often given treaties pride of place among sources of
international law."); STEINER ET AL., supra note 18, at 271 ("Whatever its purpose or character,
the international agreement is generally recognized from the perspective of international law as
an authoritative starting point for legal reasoning about any dispute to which it is relevant."); see
also 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 86-87 (1970). As
Lauterpacht explains:
The rights and duties of States are determined in the first instance, by their
agreement as expressed in treaties .... When a controversy arises between two or
more States with regard to a matter regulated by a treaty, it is natural that the
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treaty and custom have seemingly favored treaties. "Treaties ordinarily
clearly show the legal rule because they are in written form. Moreover,
treaties are subject to the explicit acceptance of states. Treaties therefore
can often be clearer in their terms and more certain in their acceptance
than other sorts of international law sources.
3
Such a hierarchy and list of sources reflects the prevailing positivist
understanding of international law. 4 According to this view, international
law is based primarily on the consent of sovereign states. 5 Treaties, having
been negotiated, written, signed, and ratified, present the strongest evidence
of consent. 6 That the states signing the document consented to be so bound
is easy to conceptualize. Customary international law presents a more
difficult problem, but here, too, the basis is seen as consent-in this case,
"implied" consent: Evidence of general state practice, in the absence of
parties should invoke and that the adjudicating agency should apply, in the first
instance, the provisions of the treaty in question.
Id.
33. JANIS & NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 18, at 22.
34. Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century
International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1999) ("Despite subsequent attempts to reformulate
the foundations of international law, the fundamental positivist position, that states are the
principle actors of international law and that they are bound only by that to which they have
consented, continues to operate as the basic premise of the international legal system."); Aaron
Fichtelberg, Legal Rules and International Society, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 157, 161 (2001)
(reviewing ANTHONY CLARKE AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1999))
(discussing a "more-or-less traditional exposition of the positivist doctrine of sources: states
create international law through their 'consent' (found in the practices of these states, coupled
with opinio juris, as well as with the formulation of treaties)," and "the traditional sources of
international law-treaties, custom, and 'general principles'"); see also SCHACHTER, supra note
17, at 35-36. Schachter states:
The principal intellectual instrument in the last century for providing objective
standards of legal validation has been the doctrine of sources.... The emphasis in
this doctrine on criteria of law applied solely on the basis of observable 'positive'
facts can be linked to those intellectual currents of the nineteenth century that
extolled inductive science.
Id.
35. See Charney, supra note 20, at 531 ("Perhaps the most popular theory is that states
become bound to the international legal system on the basis of social contract, actual consent
or tacit consent."); Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters: Non-State Actors, Treaties, and
the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 137, 141 (2005) ("[M]ost
international lawyers continue to explain how these rules constitute law by referring to the
notion that 'the general consent of states creates rules of general application.'" (citing IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (6th ed. 1995))).
36. SeeJANIS & NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 22.
37. OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 22. Oppenheim states:
The sources of International Law are therefore twofold-namely: (1) express
consent, which is given when States conclude a treaty stipulating certain rules for
the future international conduct of the parties; (2) tacit consent, which is given
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consistent dissent, is seen as evidence of tacit acquiescence by all states to
the customary rule.38 As the evidence of consent to custom is more
attenuated than consent to treaties, it should not be surprising that treaties
are given a place of honor. Even when generalized state consent to a
particular custom might be clearer, the scope of what has been consented to
will remain difficult to pin down.
B. EARLIER VIEWS ON THE SOURCES OFINTERNATIONAL LAW
Treaties did not always carry so much weight. Until relatively recently in
world history, treaties, and in particular multilateral treaties, were the
exception rather than the norm. It was custom, rather than treaty, that
formed "the older and the original source of International Law."3 9 The
grand majority of international law was customary. Earlier international law
theorists were thus primarily concerned with custom and with explaining the
largely unwritten rules that appeared to govern the relations of states.
The most prominent early explanation was natural reason. According to
this view, the law of nations was the necessary outgrowth of the laws of
nature and could be discerned through the application of reason. Such a
theory explained why and how states had come to follow agreed-upon rules
of international relations and why such rules had been discussed and
debated in legal terms. Two of the earliest thinkers associated with
international law, Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, took just such a
natural-law view-albeit with strongly religious undertones. 40 Hugo Grotius,
writing in the seventeenth century and often referred to as the "founder" or
"father" of international law, took a more complex view, combining
elements of both natural reason and consent. For Grotius, international law
had two sources: (1) the law of nature and (2) mutual consent-or, in his
through States having adopted the custom of submitting to certain rules of
international conduct.
Id.
38. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. d (1987). The
Restatement provides:
Although customary law may be built by the acquiescence as well as by the actions
of states (Comment b) and become generally binding on all states, in principle a
state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of
development is not bound by that rule even after it matures.
Id.; see also Chantal Thomas, Customary International Law and State Taxation of Corporate Income:
The Case for the Separate Accounting Method, 14 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 99, 114 (1996) (identifying as
a characteristic of customary international law that "[t] he international law must be consistently
practiced by nations whose interests it clearly affects, with the tacit consent or acquiescence by
those nations whose interests it does not").
39. OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 22.
40. See, e.g., Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L.
477, 482 (1982); Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 786 (1994).
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terms, "the law of nations."4' These two sources, however, were deeply and
inextricably intertwined. An observed custom could be evidence of either a
principle derived from the law of nature or of mutual consent.42 Rules of
international law could be derived from natural reason, but customary
international law was also evidence of what natural reason required.43
Grotius's framework married custom and reason, imbuing the practice and
apiniojuris of states with great power and legitimacy. 44
A century later, in the mid-eighteenth century, Emerich de Vattel
described the law of nations as a system "based on the principles of the law
of nature and written with a view to practical application. 45 Vattel
differentiated between rules derived from the law of nature and rules
derived from human agreement, "[h]owever, it was the guiding natural law
that controlled: No agreement could bind, or even authorize, a man to
violate natural law."46 A few years later, Sir William Blackstone took a similar
natural-law view in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. According to
Blackstone:
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible from natural
reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized
inhabitants of the world ... but such rules must necessarily result
41. "[Wlhen many at different times, and in different places, affirm the same thing as
certain, that ought to refer to a universal cause; and this cause . . .must be either a correct
conclusion drawn from the principles of nature, or common consent." 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE
JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 23-24 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans.,
Clarendon Press 1925) (1625).
42. Adding to the confusion, "Grotius often speaks of the law of nature and the law of
nations as if the two impose identical obligations on states-as if, notwithstanding their
different sources, the law of nature and the law of nations speak to states with one voice."
INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
36 (RobertJ. Beck et al. eds., 1996).
43. According to Grotius, the law of nature could be proven by either of two means: a
priori, "by demonstrating the necessary agreement or disagreement of anything with a rational
and social nature," see GROTIUS, supra note 41, at 42, and a posteriori (as a matter of probability
if not absolute certainty), by showing what is believed to be the law of nature "among all
nations, or among all those that are more advanced in civilization." Id.; see also Benedict
Kingsbury, A Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice?: Grotius, Law, and Moral Skepticism in the
Thought of Hedley Bull, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 3, 22-23 (1997) (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DEJURE
BELLI AC PACIS I.i.12 (n.p. 1625)).
44. Cf DavidJ. Bederman, Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius'De
Jure Beli ac Pacis, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 8 n.26 (1996) ("Grotius' consideration of
universality and right reason tracks our modern notions of the formation of customary
international law, including the requirements of a general practice and opiniojuris (a sense that
a practice is carried out because of legal obligation).").
45. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 156 (rev. ed. 1954).
46. Jianmeng Shen, The Relativity and Historical Perspective of the Golden Age of International
Law, 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 15, 20 (2000). Although natural law does play a prominent role,
Vattel has often been described as a nascent positivist because of his differentiation of the law of
nations and the law of nature. SeeAnghie, supra note 34, at 12.
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from those principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of
each nation agree: or they depend upon mutual compacts or
treaties between respective communities; in the construction of
which there is also no judge to resort to, but the law of nature and
reason, being the only one in which all the contracting parties are
equally conversant, and to which they are equally subject.
47
Customary international law was thus derived from natural reason (though
consent seems to play some unclear role). 48 Treaties were secondary, and
they, too, were to be construed in accordance with natural reason. 49
Within the natural-law framework adopted by these earlier thinkers,
custom became quite powerful, both theoretically and normatively. The
often-mysterious process by which practices become accepted as law, or
opinio juris, was explained and imbued with divine, or natural, rationality.
Treaties, although practically important, were almost by necessity a
theoretical afterthought. Although a treaty could codify the requirements of
natural law, generally, its content would arise solely from the agreement of
two or more states. Moreover, the ultimate legitimacy and law-quality of the
treaty would depend on customary international law and right reason,
namely the customary rule that states must follow their agreements, also
known as pacta sunt servanda.50
Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, various factors
converged to change this general understanding. On the theoretical front,
natural law was facing increasing pressure. International lawyers increasingly
"sought to present their discipline as 'scientific' in character, "5 to emulate
the natural sciences, and to identify a methodology and definitions for use
in interpreting international law. "[T]his involved redefining the discipline
47. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 66-67 (Univ. of Chic. Press 1979) (1765-
1769).
48. Interestingly, in Triquet v. Bath, a 1764 decision of William Murray, Lord Mansfield,
Blackstone, appearing as an attorney in the case, argued on the basis of general customary law
of nations. See MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-52
(2004) [hereinafter, JANIS, AMERICAN TRADITION].
49. James Kent held similar views:
The law of nations is a complex system, composed of various ingredients. It
consists of general principles of right and justice, equally suitable to the
government of individuals in a state of natural equality, and to the relation and
conduct of nations; of a collection of usages and customs, the growth of civilization
and commerce, and a code of conventional or positive law.
Id. at 28 (quoting I JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 2-3 (New York, Halstead
1832) (1826-1830)).
50. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 107 (1999) ("Treaty
rules . . . are based on the general customary rule of pacta sunt servanda, which requires that
treaty obligations be upheld in good faith.").
51. Anghie, supra note 34, at 10.
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in ways that appeared compatible with the scientific framework in an
attempt not only to elevate their discipline, but their profession." 2
International law theorists were also increasingly responding to the
criticisms ofJohn Austin.53 Austin, "the foremost spokesman for positivism at
the time,"54 had sought to distinguish law from morality and excise
references to natural law. Instead, he defined law as the command of the
sovereign backed by force.55 For Austin, in the absence of any international
sovereign, international law could not be law at all. 56 By his estimation,
international law belonged to "a set of objects frequently, but improperly
termed laws," more akin to "'[t]he law of honour"' or "'[t]he law set by
fashion.' 57 What was called international law was nothing more than
positive morality.
These intellectual trends58 were buttressed by practical changes in the
world international lawyers were describing. Treaty-making, and in
particular multilateral treaty-making, increased dramatically over the
period.5 9 A growing number of international conferences-including the
1863 Postal Conference, the 1863 Geneva Red Cross Conference, the 1884
Berlin Conference on the Future of the Congo, and the 1899 and 1907
Hague Peace Conferences-were convened to deal with international law
topics.6° A wide variety of international institutions were also created to deal
52. Id. at 18.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id.
55. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 9 (David Campbell &
Philip Thomas eds., Ashgate 1998) (1832); see also id. at 101 (arguing that "[l]aws properly so
called are a species of commands" and "every law properly so called flows from a determinate
source").
56. "[T] he law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by
a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author." Id at 152.
57. Id. at 10.
58. Martti Koskenniemi identifies another influential theoretical challenge in Friedrich
Carl Von Savigny's historical school of law, which criticized the static nature of international law
derived from immutable natural reason. To the extent international law was derived from
natural reason, its rules could not change-the correct rules have always been correct and
always will be correct. Instead, Savigny argued that law should be seen as an organic and
evolving outgrowth of the popular consciousness. MARTri KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER
OF NATIONS 43-47 (2002). According to Koskenniemi, it was Savigny's arguments that inspired
Johann Caspar Bluntschli to write his international law code in 1867. See id. At the same time,
Savigny's historical school heavily influenced the Institut de droit international, which in 1873
described its goal as to be "the legal conscience of the civilized world." See id. at 41, 47.
59. SeeJANIS, AMERICAN TRADITION, supra note 48, at 119 (citing NUSSBAUM, supra note 45,
at 196-97, and estimating that ten to sixteen thousand treaties were ratified during that
period); Shen, supra note 46, at 25 (citing NUSSBAUM, supra note 45, at 196-97, for the estimate
that '"about sixteen thousand treaties were concluded between [1815] and 1924'"); see also
OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 23 ("Treaties are the second source of International Law, and a
source which has of late become of the greatest importance.").
60. See Shen, supra note 46, at 25-26.
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with issues as varied as telegraph administration, the abolition of slavery, and
public health. 61
The period also saw an increased interest in the codification of existing
customary international law. Johann Caspar Bluntschli, a Swiss lawyer and
professor, published a "code-like" international law treatise in 1868,62 and
David Dudley Field, the American who prepared the 1848 New York Code of
Civil Procedure, published a draft international code in 1872. 3 Codification
culminated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which attempted to
codify the laws of war. 4 All of these developments made deriving
international law from multilateral treaties look increasingly possible and
engendered optimism that the relatively small (though growing) group of
states could solve coordination problems through negotiation.
These changes in international legal thinking and the practice of
states65 help explain why " [t] he late nineteenth century was ... the period in
which positivism decisively replaced naturalism as the principal
jurisprudential technique of the discipline of international law."
66
International law needed to become more scientific, and state consent
seemed to provide an answer.67 State consent could provide a positivist basis
for international law in the absence of a sovereign and could be used as a
scientific criterion of investigation.
The international legal positivism that emerged may be best
exemplified by Lassa Oppenheim's early twentieth century international law
textbook. First, Oppenheim explained that international law is law between
sovereign states, not individuals:
[T] he law of Nations is a law for the intercourse of States with one
another, not a law for individuals. As, however, there cannot be a
sovereign authority above the single sovereign states, the Law of
Nations is a law between, not above, the single States, and is,
therefore, since Bentham, also called "International Law."
68
61. See id.
62. JANis, AMERICAN TRADITION, supra note 48, at 119; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 58, at 42-
47.
63. JANIS, AMERICAN TRADITION, supra note 48, at 118-19.
64. See Shen, supra note 46, at 25-26.
65. Other factors contributed to the positivist shift as well. See generally Anghie, supra note
34 (noting the influence that colonialism and the interactions between western and non-
western powers had on the rise of positivism in international law).
66. Id. at 2.
67. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw, at xxv (3d ed. 1993) ("The rise of
positivism in Western political and legal theory, especially from the latter part of the 18th
century to the early part of the 20th century, corresponds to the steady rise of the national state
and its increasingly absolute claims to legal and political supremacy.").
68. OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 4.
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Second, "the basis of the Law of Nations is the common consent of the
member States of the Family of Nations."69 The consent takes two forms:
(1) express consent, which is given when States conclude a treaty
stipulating certain rules for the future international conduct of the
parties; (2) tacit consent, which is given through States having
adopted the custom of submitting to certain rules of international
conduct. Treaties and custom are, therefore, exclusively the
sources of the Law of Nations.
70
Finally, "[n]atural law, in Oppenheim's view, forms no part of international
law; and indeed he holds in addition that it does not exist."
71
Many of the trends supporting Oppenheim's positivism have continued
over the past century. Both multilateral treaties and international
institutions have multiplied, and states are increasingly interwoven by
formal, structured, written relations. These trends have continued to
enhance the stature of treaties. But at the same time, a great deal has
changed since Oppenheim first wrote his textbook. Two world wars have
been fought, the European empires have crumbled, a Cold War has ended,
and the number of states in the international system has increased many
times. International law has reached deeper and deeper into the internal
affairs of states, making individuals increasingly subjects of international
law. 72 Non-state actors (e.g., corporations and NGOs) unconnected to a
particular state have increasingly influenced international law. And over
time, numerous powerful alternatives to positivism have been developed,
including the New Haven policy school, international legal process,
transnational legal process, international law as legitimacy, and liberal
international law theory.73 Nonetheless, the positivist method and hierarchy
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. at 22 (internal citation omitted).
71. Hedley Bull, The Grotian Conception of International Society, in DIPLOMATIC
INVESTIGATIONs 51 (Herbert Butterfield & Martin Wight eds., 1966), reprinted in HEDLEY BULL
ON INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 95, 111 (Kai Alderson & Andrew Hurrell eds., 2000).
72. See, e.g., Gabriel M. Wilner, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Comments on Sources of Human Rights
Law and Means of Redress for Violations of Human Rights, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 317, 320
(1981) ("The notion that all individuals have rights independent of what may be granted them
under national law, including their own national law, adds a dimension to international law
unknown to it when the sources of the law of nations were set forth in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.").
73. For examples of each school of thought, see generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 10
(discussing transnational legal process); FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 15
(discussing international law as legitimacy); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907 (1992) (discussing liberal
international law theory); Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7 (discussing
transnational legal process); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function
in the World Constitutive Process: How International Law Is Made, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS
355, 377 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981) (discussing the New Haven
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laid out by Oppenheim remain the durable tools used by most international
lawyers. 4
II. THEY SHOOT TREATIES, DON'T THEY?:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE POSITVIST HIERARCHY
The resilience of Oppenheim's system has been tested as a changing
world and new developments have forced international lawyers to stretch (to
the breaking point?) old categories and theories in multiple directions.
Challenges to the positivist hierarchy include dramatic changes to the shape
of the international system and the emergence of new sources of
international law. Other challenges include the apparent gap growing
between treaties and state action and concerns about treaties' relative
inability to adapt quickly enough to a constantly changing world.
A. GROWING PAINS
The world looked very different in 1905 when the first edition of
Oppenheim's International Law: A Treatise was published. Only a handful of
states made up the European international law system. The group of actors
was sufficiently small that Oppenheim could refer to a "Family of Nations."
75
Moreover, imperialism was at its height, and much of Africa and Asia
remained under the control of a very few European states. Even after the
inclusion of Japan, Liberia, Haiti, and Turkey,76 Oppenheim's system
remained mostly European-American and continued to be dominated by
the Great Powers. International institutions, although on the rise, were
nascent and thin.
The international landscape looks very different today. The current list
of states now numbers over two hundred. The empires of the Great Powers
have been largely liquidated, and European states no longer make up a
majority of the players in the international system. Moreover, international
institutions are now everywhere, ranging from the United Nations, the
World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the
World Bank to far more mundane institutions like the International
Organization for Standardization ("ISO"). Oppenheim described a world in
which the relatively few states drew from a common culture to create a
relatively thin international legal system. Perhaps paradoxically, the
international system is now made up of a multitude of very different states
policy school); W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118 (1992) (same).
74. See Hollis, supra note 35, at 3-5; see also Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in and with
International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
105, 110 (2003).
75. OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, at 12, 16-18.
76. Id. at 32-34.
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with very different histories, interconnected by an increasingly thick set of
international obligations.
Such changes strain the old hierarchy in a number of ways. First, proof
of consent becomes considerably more attenuated. The vast majority of
states had no say in (or ability to object to) the international system put in
place after World War II. Their consent to the basic rules of the system is a
presumed price of entrance and membership in the international system.
77
Second, the massive increase in the number of states must have an
impact on the meaning, nature, and content of treaties. Multilateral treaties
on important issues of international law were already difficult to agree on in
Oppenheim's day, when the consent of only a few states was required.
Negotiating between and getting the consent of two hundred states must be
more difficult. Agreements may have to be thinner. Moreover, to the extent
those states can agree, a number of questions must be asked. Do all of those
states agree on the ground rules? Do they all intend to be bound? Do they
all invest the process of treaty-making with the same meaning as the older
members of the international system? Most of all, do they all necessarily
interpret the treaty's meaning in the same way? 71 Under the traditional
understanding of the doctrine of sources, these concerns are largely
irrelevant to the question of whether a rule constitutes law. Formal consent
to the system and a treaty are what matter. But such questions must place the
positivist theory in some doubt.
At the same time that the number of states was exploding, the nature of
international law was evolving. Although states continue to sign a multitude
of bilateral treaties primarily concerned with economic, political, and
military coordination, the past century has witnessed an extraordinary surge
in multilateral treaties, many of which seem more concerned with signatory
states' internal affairs than with their international relationships.79 Examples
include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),
the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
77. Accordingly, whether any particular state currently "consents" in the manner
presumed by Oppenheim's theory can only be a matter of speculation. Some new states may
very well see the international system as a system of sovereign equality that works to their
advantage. Others may see it as imperialism in different clothes-a regime they tolerate, but
hardly accept. Others still, usually "rogue states," have chosen simply to disregard the system
altogether.
78. For former colonies, for example, international law may be viewed as a tool for
vindicating their rights as equal members of the system or as a tool of subjugation that forces
them to follow rules written by their one-time occupiers. See, e.g., B. S. Chimni, Third World
Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER:
LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION 72 (Antony Anghie et al. eds., 2003) ("A growing
assemblage of international laws, institutions and practices coalesce to erode the independence
of third world countries in favor of transnational capital and powerful States.").
79. See, e.g., Wilner, supra note 72, at 318 ("Since World War II, however, the direct right
of individuals to the protection of their lives and of other civil and political rights has slowly
gained recognition, independent of the right of redress by states of which they are nationals.").
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and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.80 These treaties are
not necessarily of a different sort than earlier treaties; these treaties often
combine both interstate and intrastate elements and must be seen along a
continuum with more traditional state-coordination treaties. Nonetheless,
the shift of subject matter to human rights and environmental regulation
does change the rules of the game. The traditional bilateral state-
coordination treaty can rely on reciprocity as a guaranty of both consent and
compliance. If one party fails to live up to its side of the bargain, the other
party can respond by reneging on its obligation. The treaty only provides the
desired benefit for both sides if both sides comply. Although modern
multilateral human rights treaties may include mechanisms for ensuring
compliance and states may respond to a breach by one party with reprisals of
a different sort (e.g., sanctions, invasion), simple reciprocity is not
81
available. If a state tortures its citizens in violation of its treaty obligations,
another state cannot torture its own citizens as a reprisal. If a state releases
toxic materials into the environment, another state cannot do likewise in
response. As Part II.D explains, there are reasons to suspect that the absence
of this mechanism leads to less compliance. It may also cast doubt on what
states intend when they ratify such treaties.
All of these changes make the optimism about treaties that pervaded
the traditional doctrine of sources harder to sustain. They may no longer
provide the same evidence of consent and may not exert the same force.
They may no longer carry the clarity and certainty that they once did, and
the ability to reach comprehensive, widespread, international agreement
through treaties cannot be taken for granted.
B. NEW SOURCES AND METHODS
Another challenge to the positivist doctrine of sources arises from the
presence of new types of sources that appear to be expressions of what
international law requires but that fit uncomfortably between treaty and
custom. Various declarations of the international community, including
80. A high percentage of states have ratified these treaties. As ofJuly 7, 2003, 99% of states
had ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 91% had ratified the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women, 78% had ratified the ICCPR, and 70% had ratified the Genocide
Convention and Convention Against Torture. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 108
(citing Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratfications of the Principal
International Human Rights Treaties, available at http://www.ohchr.org (updated June 9, 2004)).
Other widely ratified human rights treaties include the International Covenant on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by 88% of states, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ratified by 77% of states. Id.
81. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935,
1938 (2002) [hereinafter Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties] ("[U]nlike in the case of trade
agreements, the costs of retaliatory noncompliance are low to nonexistent, because a nation's
actions against its own citizens do not directly threaten or harm other states.").
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12U.N. General Assembly declarations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, fall short of the formal requirements of treaties. The
increase in multilateral treaty-making has also led to an increasing number
of multilateral treaties that, although not yet ratified by some states, declare
83the presence of universal rights or norms. Some of these specifically claim
to be mere codifications of custom, while others seem to express the general
consensus on a new rule of international law.
Courts and international theorists have developed a number of tools to
deal with these new sources. Unlike ratified treaties, these sources have not
been treated as statements of law in and of themselves. Instead, these
sources have been seen as possible evidence of customary international law.
This can work in three ways. First, the treaty or declaration may merely
codify customary international law; the text would thus help identify the
814
scope of the customary rule already in place. Second, the treaty or
declaration may represent the "crystallization" of a rule of customary
82. AsJustice Schwebel explained:
The General Assembly has no authority to enact international law .... If a
resolution purports to be declaratory of international law, if it is adopted
unanimously (or virtually so, qualitatively as well as quantitively) or by consensus,
and if it corresponds to State practice, it may be declaratory of international law.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 319 (July
18) (dissenting opinion ofJustice Schwebel).
83. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 61st plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) (not yet ratified by the United States). But see Beharry v.
Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 600 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("While the [Convention on the Rights of the
Child ("CRC")] is relatively new, it contains many provisions codifying longstanding legal
norms.... These provisions ... are not so novel as to be considered outside the bounds of
what is customary. Similar doctrines have long been a part of our law."), rev'd sub nom., Beharry
v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2003). See also International Convention on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (not yet ratified by
the United States, among others); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/45/158/Annex (Dec. 18, 1990) (in force, but not yet ratified by the United States, United
Kingdom, France, and other major Western industrial powers). In fact, only the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on the protection of civilians and prisoners during war have been ratified by all
states. See Nauru Signs Up to Geneva Conventions, RADIO N.Z. INT'L, Aug. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=26274 ("The [International Committee of
the Red Cross] says the Geneva Conventions have 194 signatories, marking for the first time in
modern history that an international treaty has achieved universal acceptance.").
84. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16,
47 (June 21) ("The rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach (adopted without a
dissenting vote) may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law
on the subject."); see also Avero Belguim Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 n.8 (2d Cir.
2005) ("[T]he United States has never ratified the Convention. Accordingly, the Vienna
Convention is not a primary source of customary international law, but rather one of the
secondary sources 'summarizing international law.'" (internal citations omitted)).
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international law that had been slowly forming. 5 Third, the treaty or
declaration can be rule-generating, providing a focal point around which
custom may coalesce after, and as a result of, the document's adoption8 6
All three of these mechanisms help bring these new sources into the
structure of the traditional doctrine of sources. Nonetheless, by focusing on
the dynamic relationship between these documents and custom, and the
role these documents may have in declaring, forming, and generating
norms, these mechanisms also undermine the formalism of the positivist
system. Rather than focusing on the discovery of static individual rules, these
mechanisms emphasize process and norm creation.
C. TREA TIES NEVER DE
In the face of all the changes in the international system, treaties
remain static-unchanged by the world around them. One of the main
benefits of treaties is the certainty that comes from clear, written terms.
States can rely on the treaty even as circumstances change. A new
government, for example, is considered bound by the treaties of previous
regimes. This reliability allows treaties to act as a stabilizing force in a chaotic
world. But the certainty and stability that gives treaties their standing within
the traditional doctrine of sources also presents a challenge to that
dominance. Treaties can often seem anachronistic as the world changes
around them. "After a while, the Treaty can become a rather self-defeating
and restrictive matrix on which to project flexibility in the light of modern
circumstances: it can become an obstacle for updated relationships rather
than a facilitator of that evolution."
87
85. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.D. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 2, 39 (Feb. 20)
(explaining that Article 1 to 3 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf "were then
regarded as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary
international law relative to the continental shelf"); see also Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162,
199 (D. Mass. 2004) ("Regional conventions and treaties mirror international developments,
and further confirm the crystallization of customary international law.").
86. An unratified treaty could:
[G]enerate[] a rule which, while only conventional or contractual in its origin, has
since passed into the general corpus of international law, and is now accepted as
such by the opinio juris, so as to have become binding even for countries which
have never, and do not, become parties to the Convention. There is no doubt that
this process is a perfectly possible one and does from time to time occur: it
constitutes indeed one of the recognized methods by which new rules of customary
international law may be formed.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 l.C.J. at 41; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883
(2d Cir. 1980) ("[I]t has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 'no
longer fits into the dichotomy of "binding treaty" against "non-binding pronouncement," but is
rather an authoritative statement of the international community.'" (internal citation
omitted)).
87. Jeremy Waldron, F.W. Guest Memorial Lecture, The Half-Life of Treaties: Waitangi,
Rebus Sic Stantibus, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 161, 167 (2005).
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Of course, treaties can change. The parties can agree to amend them. 8
Oftentimes, treaties include provisions specifically outlining how states can
withdraw. ° Most of all, international law recognizes that treaties can fall into
desuetude9° and recognizes fundamental changes in circumstances, or rebus
sic stantibus,9' as an excuse for nonperformance of a treaty obligation.
92
However, perhaps because both desuetude and fundamental change cut
against the very stability that treaties promise, the mechanisms underlying
each are unclear93 and they are rarely successfully invoked.94 A provision that
88. SeeJANIS & NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 49.
89. See DAMROSCH ETAL., supra note 18, at 538-39.
90. See Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 957 (2005)
("International law scholars have long recognized that outdated treaty rules can also lose their
bite, although the issue is addressed in the major works only in passing."); see also Concerning
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. 3, at 47 (1977) (recognizing "the
possibility that a development in customary law may, under certain conditions, evidence the
assent of the States concerned to the modification, or even termination, of previously existing
treaty rights and obligations"); ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 89 (1999) ("If... as time passes, the treaty as a whole, or a particular provision of the
treaty, loses authority and control, the putative rule contained in the treaty or the provision no
longer reflects the willingness of states to restrict their behavior in a given way.").
91. Rebus sic stantibus, originally a customary international law rule, has since been codified
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Under Article 62 of the Convention, a
fundamental change of circumstances may be "invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty" if "(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the
change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, art, 62.
92. Waldron points out a particularly good example of how Turkey, in negotiating the
1922-1923 Treaty of Lausanne, successfully convinced the British, French, Italians, Japanese,
and Americans that the fundamental change in the nature of the state generally and the
Turkish state specifically had vitiated the old regime of capitulations. Waldron, supra note 87, at
171-72.
93. See Glennon, supra note 90, at 957-58; see also ATHANASSIOS VAMVOUKOS, TERMINATION
OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE DOCTRINES OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS AND DESUETUDE
219 (1985) ("Even those jurists who have discussed the implications of desuetude have
themselves been puzzled as how to relate it to any objective rule of law.").
94. See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.CJ. 7 (Sept. 25)
(rejecting excuse); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 2) (same); see also
Dedev F. Vagts, Rebus Revisited: Changed Circumstances in Treaty Law, 43 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L.
459, 475 (2005) ("What can be said is that rebus sic stantibus will not avail unless the change of
circumstances is clearly a drastic change from the circumstances anticipated by the parties.").
Among the obstacles to the successful invocation of rebus sic stantibus, Article 62 states that
fundamental change
may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the fundamental change is the
result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the
treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the
treaty.
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would have allowed a treaty to "be modified by subsequent practice ' ''°5 was
deleted from the final draft of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 96 and fundamental change was rejected as an excuse in the two
cases in which it was argued before the ICJ.97
Without clear rules for change, debates over the status of treaties simply
go unresolved. Debates over the meaning and scope of Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter's prohibition of "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state,"98 provide a useful
example.99 Some have argued that as a result of consistent violation, Article
2(4) has become a dead-letter provision and that the rules against the use of
force and non-intervention have fallen into desuetude. 00 Others have
argued that NATO's intervention in Kosovo has established an exception to
Article 2(4) for humanitarian intervention. °1 Still others argue that Article
2(4) remains very much in force.'0 2 There is no clear principle to determine
the right answer.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 23, art. 62. These conditions, in
particular the requirement that "the fundamental change is [not] the result of a breach by the
party invoking it," are high hurdles to jump. See Waldron, supra note 87, at 17.
95. Glennon, supra note 90, at 957-58 (citing SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW OF TREATIES, 1945-1986, at 9 (1989)).
96. See id. at 958 & n.95 ("'[R]etention of that article' could have 'opened the way to
controlled and orderly flexibility in the evolution both of the law in general, and of specific
rights and duties of States in particular.'" (quoting ROSENNE, supra note 95, at 9)). In the end,
"[tihe deletion 'may be regretted.'" Id. at 958 (quoting ROSENNE, supra note 95, at 9).
97. See sources cited supra note 94. In the most well-known of these cases, the ICJ refused
to absolve post-communist Hungary of its duties under a Soviet-era treaty with the no-longer-
extant Czechoslovakia to build dams on the Danube river. See generally Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7.
98. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
99. This example is particularly useful because it demonstrates the difficulty of amending
the treaty through a new one. Agreement by all the world's states to a new U.N. Charter
provision is difficult to imagine.
100. See Glennon, supra note 90, at 958-59 (citing Thomas M. Franck, Some Observations on
the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 116, 119 (1987), and Thomas M.
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM.J. INT'L L. 809, 809 (1970)).
101. See id. at 969-70. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo
Intervention: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 834, 836 (1999)
(developing a test for when humanitarian intervention would be appropriate); W. Michael
Reisman, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM.J. INT'L L.
860 (1999) (discussing the Kosovo intervention in the context of Article 2(4)); Ruth
Wedgwood, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93
AM.J. INT'L L. 828 (1999) (discussing the humanitarian'ole of the Kosovo intervention and its
implications for the United Nations). But see Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, NATO's Kosovo
Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention, "93 AM.J. INT'L L. 824, 826 (1999)
(arguing that intervention, even humanitarian intervention, is and should remain unlawful).
102. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PiTr. L. REV. 889, 891
n.l (2002).
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In the face of evolving international consensus, the static rules of
treaties remain supreme. The law they identify may seem remote from
current needs and understandings. Some scholars, seeing such gaps between
the realities of practice and the provisions of treaties, have started to search
for a principle that would explain and control how and when treaties can
change. 1 3 For now, however, the process for changing treaties remains less
understood'" than the deeply debated and theorized processes for changing
custom.'0 3 Treaties retain their durability.
D. MIND THE GAP
While the three challenges mentioned above are largely theoretical,
perhaps the most troubling challenge to the positivist hierarchy is empirical.
Recent empirical studies have suggested a growing gap between what treaties
require and what the states that have acceded to them actually do. This gap
seems particularly pronounced for human rights treaties. For example,
Oona Hathaway collected data regarding the human rights activities of states
that had ratified five "universal" 0 6 human rights treaties: the Genocide
Convention, the Convention Against Torture, Article 21 of the Torture
Convention ("Torture Convention"), the ICCPR, and the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women, as well the Optional Protocols to both the ICCPR
and Torture Convention. 0 7 Hathaway found that "[tiaken together, the
results for the group of universal treaties indicate that treaty ratification is
usually not associated with statistically significantly different human rights
ratings from what would otherwise be expected" in the absence of those
treaties.'0 8 "More surprisingly, however," Hathaway found that "when
ratification is associated with statistically significantly different human rights
ratings, it is associated with worse, rather than better, human rights ratings
than would otherwise be expected."'0 9 Regional human rights treaties fare
even worse. "The results of these analyses suggest that ratification of regional
human rights treaties is not infrequently associated with worse than
expected human rights practices.
103. See generally Glennon, supra note 90 (developing a theory of treaty desuetude);
Waldron, supra note 87 (considering the effect that fundamental changes in the international
system should have on existing treaty rules).
104. See Glennon, supra note 90, at 957; Waldron, supra note 87, at 167-69.
105. See generally Roberts, supra note 31 (discussing the literature on custom in international
law).
106. Hathaway uses "universal" to refer to treaties open to ratification by all states. See
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 81, at 1992.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1994.
109. Id.
110. Id at 1995.
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Hathaway is not an international law skeptic; her goal is to understand
compliance and to make international law more effective. But her results
suggest that human rights treaties have no observable effect on the actions
of states; the fact that a human rights norm has been made "law" by its
inclusion in a treaty seems to have little effect. Hathaway's results have thus
fueled skepticism about the robustness and efficacy of human rights
treaties."' In their recent book, The Limits of International Law, Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that Hathaway's studies, along with the
empirical work of another scholar," 2 demonstrate the weakness of human
rights treaties and the limited possibilities of international law and
cooperation." 3 According to Goldsmith and Posner, "The bottom line" is
"that there is no evidence that ratification of human rights treaties affects
human rights practices.""
4
Goldsmith and Posner find other evidence of these treaties'
ineffectiveness in the apparent failure of the reporting and complaint
regimes the treaties set up. Many of the treaties have relatively undemanding
reporting obligations, "yet states do not appear to take seriously their
obligation to submit reports."1 5 As they explain, "More than 70 percent of
parties have overdue reports," "at least 110 states have five or more overdue
reports," and "about 25 percent have initial overdue reports.""i6 "Perhaps
111. Hathaway's study is not beyond criticism. Ryan Goodman and DerekJinks have argued
that "Hathaway's project is in important respects flawed," identifying "(1) defects in Hathaway's
research design; (2) structural deficiencies in her theoretical model; and (3) troubling
implications of her policy analysis." Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of
Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 172 (2003). Among other things, they raise
concerns over Hathaway's choice of data, in particular, the mechanisms used for measuring
human rights violations and how some improvements in human rights practices, such as
increasing free speech and accountability, may make negative human rights practices more
visible. See id. at 176-78. One might even go further and wonder whether complex questions
like human rights practices are really capable of measurement. This Article reaches no
conclusion regarding the accuracy of Hathaway's study. What is important here is that these
studies seem to support the intuition that human rights treaties are widely disregarded and that
these studies provide fodder for arguments about international law's ineffectiveness.
112. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 120 (citing Linda Camp Keith, The United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights
Behavior?, 36J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999)).
113. Although they do not dismiss these treaties entirely, their discussion takes a highly
skeptical tone. See id. at 119.
114. Id. at 121. Goldsmith and Posner's book has spawned a veritable cottage industry of
articles questioning their methodology and conclusion. See, e.g., Symposium, The Limits of
International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253 (2006) (including articles by Kenneth
Anderson, Daniel Bodansky, Allen Buchanan, David M. Golove, Andrew T. Guzman, Margaret
E. McGuiness, PeterJ. Spiro, and Kal Raustiala). This Article does not engage this debate. The
important point here is how Goldsmith and Posner use empirical data like Hathaway's as proof
of their conclusions about the thinness of human rights law.
115. See GOLDSMITH& POSNER, supra note 1, at 120.
116. Id.
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the best indication of the failure of this system," argue Goldsmith and
Posner, "is that although 1.4 billion people have the formal right under
these treaties to file complaints against their governments, there are only
about sixty complaints per year.""
7
Moreover, state practices in ratifying the treaties imply that states never
intended the treaties to impact their behavior. Goldsmith and Posner note
that liberal democracies qualified their acceptance of the ICCPR with a
myriad of Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations ("RUDs")
designed to equate treaty compliance with their current practices. Thus, the
United Kingdom attached sixteen RUDs, the United States attached twelve,
and France attached eight. Authoritarian states attached few or no RUDs.
8
"This pattern is consistent with [Goldsmith and Posner's] hypothesized
reasons that states join the ICCPR: authoritarian states do so because they
suffer little cost from their noncompliance, and liberal democracies do so
because, after RUDs, they can comply simply by following their prior
domestic practices."'1 19
In a more recent article, Hathaway argues that those gaps between
accession and compliance present an even more paradoxical pattern.1
20
Rather than finding no correlation between treaty accession and human
rights or environmental improvements, 2 Hathaway argues that accession
and compliance are inversely related. Looking at statistics related to a
number of human rights treaties and environmental treaties, I12 Hathaway
finds that the states that are least likely to comply with human rights and
environmental norms and that have the weakest domestic institutions to
enforce treaty provisions are also those most likely to ratify human rights
117. Id,
118. For example, Algeria attached three RUDs, Syria attached one, and a long list of states,
including Belarus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Uzbekistan, attached
zero RUDs. See id. at 129.
119. Id. at 128. This is consistent with Hathaway's findings that "[h]uman rights and
environmental treaties gain adherents at a much faster pace than do comparable trade treaties."
See Hathaway, An Integrated Theory, supra note 4, at 515.
120. See Hathaway, An Integrated Theory, supra note 4, at 474 ("In short, the theory not only
provides a comprehensive vision of the potential and the limits of international law; it also gives
rise to unique (and often counterintuitive) predictions that are consistent with the available
evidence.").
121. Citing a study by Beth Simmons on the International Monetary Fund, Hathaway
explains that economic treaties appear to follow a different pattern. In those cases,
enforcement is more effective, but so too are the benefits of compliance higher. As a result,
states that accede to those treaties are more likely to comply. See id. at 519 (citing Beth
Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International
Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. So. REv. 819, 822-27 (2000)).
122. In this case, Hathaway examined statistics related to the Vienna Convention on the
Protection of Ozone Layer of 1985 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer. See id. at 515-16.
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and environmental treaties. 2 3 Thus, "[n]on democratic nations with worse
reported human rights practices appear more likely to have ratified human
rights treaties than those with better reported practices."024 Similarly,
"countries that have ratified the Vienna Convention [on the Protection of
the Ozone Layer], which established mechanisms for international
cooperation to address the effects of ozone-depleting chemicals on the
ozone layer, actually produce more chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") on
average than those that have not.' 25 How can this paradox be explained?
According to Hathaway, states with worse records and weaker institutions
have the most incentive to sign such treaties because they will get the initial
reputational benefits of signing but will never be required to comply with
the treaties' provisions. 1 6 Contrastingly, a state with strong domestic
institutions may be less likely to sign even if it generally follows the norms
described by the treaties for fear that those domestic institutions will actually
enforce the treaties' provisions.
1 2 1
The results of these studies are ominous. Those states with the clearest
legal obligations under the doctrine of sources appear least swayed to obey,
while those with less clear obligations obey as a matter of course. The link
between treaty accession and compliance is severed completely.
Law need not be universally followed in order to qualify as law-legal
systems presume the existence of lawbreakers-but if the "law" is commonly
disregarded and seems to have little impact on action, the meaningfulness of
128the "law" must be doubted. Perhaps the "law" isn't law at all. Here, the
gaps between treaties and compliance are so wide that they undermine faith
123. Id. at 474 ("[H]olding other factors constant, countries with very poor human rights
records can be as likely or even more likely to ratify treaties as countries with better records, but
that unlike those with better records, they are unlikely to comply with those commitments-
which is in fact the pattern found.").
124. Id. at 518-19.
125. Hathaway, An Integrated Theory, supra note 4, at 516.
126. As Hathaway explains:
Yet in fact these countries often have stronger incentives (and weaker
disincentives) to join human rights treaties than states with better records-first,
because such countries usually have weak rule of law and thus create limited
opportunities for domestic legal enforcement; second, because human rights
treaties usually lack trausnational legal enforcement mechanisms, such as
supranational enforcement or credible threats of state-to-state retaliation; and
finally, because such countries, by displaying their (sometimes insincere)
commitment to human rights, increase their standing among other nations,
international bodies, private investors, domestic actors, and others and thereby
obtain significant collateral benefits.
Id. at 474.
127. Id. at 509-10.
128. Glennon, supra note 90, at 956.
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in the international system and international law as a whole.'29 "The collapse
of legal rules through violation feeds upon itself, creating a downward spiral
and threatening the contagion of other legal rules." 30 If international law is
to answer its critics, it must account for these gaps.
III. CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME
The traditional doctrine of sources has served international law well
over the past century. It has helped provide structure and coherence during
a time when international law was expanding rapidly and dramatically. But
the doctrine's explanatory power is increasingly being challenged. As
mentioned above, some empirical evidence seems to indicate that the
presence of human rights (or environmental) treaties has little, if any,
impact on state behavior. Even more disturbingly, those states least likely
(and least able) to follow human rights treaties may also be most likely to
ratify them.'' If international law is identified with treaties, as the traditional
doctrine of sources suggests, and treaties bear, at best, no relationship to
state action, can international law really be "law.?
32
The next two Parts suggest a way to address these challenges. They
suggest that the problem lies not with international law as a whole but,
instead, with our means of identifying it. As such, they argue that the
orthodox doctrine of sources, with its focus on treaties and consent, needs
to be replaced. In its place, they suggest a new doctrine of sources focused
on the processes by which norms are internalized by international actors.
Part III lays the groundwork for this new doctrine by looking at two theories
of when and why states obey the laws that they do. Part V, in turn, uses the
insights borrowed from those theories to develop a method for identifying
rules of international law. The goal is not to equate law with compliance.
Instead, I hope that the new doctrine of sources that emerges will capture
which rules are treated as law in the international system and which are not
129. Roberts, supra note 31, at 762 ("Laws must bear some relation to practice if they are to
regulate conduct effectively, because laws that set unrealistic standards are likely to be
disobeyed and ultimately forgotten. This consideration particularly applies to decentralized
systems of law, such as international law, where traditional enforcement mechanisms are
unavailable or underdeveloped."); see also Hathaway, An Integrated Theory, supra note 4, at 469.
130. Glennon, supra note 90, at 956.
131. See supra Part I.D.
132. Onuma explains:
Although validity (whether law must be observed), not efficacy (whether law is
actually observed), should be the primary concern for lawyers, even a proponent of
the pure theory of law admits that the efficacy of law constitutes a condition of the
validity of law. If international law were not observed by states at all, the very
validity of international law would be lost.
Onuma, supra note 74, at 114 (internal citations omitted).
[2007]
FNDING INTERNATIONAL LA W
and bring the international law described by international lawyers closer to
the international law recognized by states.
A. FROM CONFLICT TO OBEDIENCE
One response to complaints about the inefficacy of international law
has been an increased theoretical focus on compliance. These theories have
sought to explain why states obey the rules that they do and to understand
the conditions that generate compliance with international rules.133 Gaps
between treaty and practice, these theories suggest, are essentially
implementation problems. If the rules are written in the right way, if the
right advocacy forums are utilized, and if the right enforcement mechanisms
are arrayed, states will comply with international law. Such theories have
focused on how compliance is generated through the formalized interaction
between states in international institutions, 13 4 rational-choice concerns with
state reputation,135  socialization of states within international
communities, 136 the internalization of international norms within domestic
legal systems,"' and the "compliance pull" generated by rules perceived as
"legitimate."1
38
This Part looks at two particular theories of why states comply with
international law in the absence of effective coercion: Harold Koh's theory
of transnational legal process and Thomas Franck's theory of law as
legitimacy. 139 The focus on these two theories is not meant as an
endorsement of these theories over others. Rather, these theories provide
useful illustrations of how international law can be thought of in terms of
processes and norms. In explaining why states obey and how law exerts its
force, these theories hint at a different way to think about international law's
sources. They provide a foundation for a different doctrine of sources based
133. Although these theories employ a variety of methodologies, many of them seem to
draw on the insights developed by the Constructivist school of international relations theory.
Although these theories generally accept that states act according to their perceived interests,
they argue that those interests are shaped by international institutions and norms and by
interactions between international actors. The goal of these theories is to better understand
those processes of interest construction.
134. CHAYEs & CHAYEs, supra note 10, passim.
135. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 6, passim. See generally Andrew T.
Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115 (2005) [hereinafter
Guzman, Saving Customary International Law].
136. Goodman & Jinks, Socialization and International Human Rights Law, supra note 10,
passim.
137. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 632; Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?,
supra note 14, passim.
138. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 15, passim; Franck, Legitimacy, supra
note 7, at 705.
139. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 705; Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra
note 7, at 626; see also FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 15, at 16.
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not on formality and consent, but on the internalization of international
140
norms.
1. Transnational Legal Process
One compliance theory that hints at a different model of international
law is Harold Koh's theory of transnational legal process. Koh's theory
describes "the process whereby an international law rule is interpreted
through the interaction of transnational actors in a variety of law-declaring
fora, then internalized into a nation's domestic legal system." 42 Instead of
focusing on the interaction between states at the international level, Koh
broadens his view to look at the operation of international rules within the
domestic political and legal systems of individual states.143 Koh argues that
international law obtains its force when its rules and norms become
internalized by actors within states themselves.
Drawing on studies of norm internalization in the domestic context,144
Koh argues that states come to obey international law through a process of
"interaction, interpretation, and internalization."045 Essentially, a rule becomes
internalized as different international and domestic actors-state officials,
legislators, NGOs, courts, bureaucracies, and individual "norm
,,146
entrepreneurs -- force interactions with one another over particular
suggested rules. These interactions lead to interpretations of the rules that
govern future interactions between both the original actors and others.147 A
140. In studying which laws are complied with and when, it may be important to have a
definition of the "law" that is separate and unrelated to one's theories about compliance.
Mixing the two might predetermine the study: if law is defined in part by what rules are
complied with, a study of compliance will show that laws tend to be obeyed. The goal of this
Article, however, is different. This Article does not seek to predict which rules will be followed
but, instead, seeks to identify which rules are treated as law in the international system.
Theories of compliance should be quite helpful in answering this question of social fact.
141. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 626.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 625-27.
Instead of focusing exclusively on the issues of "horizontal jawboning" at the
state-to-state level as traditional international legal process theories do, a
transnational legal process approach focuses more broadly upon the
mechanisms of "vertical domestication," whereby international law norms
"trickle down" and become incorporated into domestic legal systems.
Id.
144. See id. at 627-33. In particular, Koh uses the example of seatbelt rules and the
complicated process whereby buckling a seatbelt became an internalized default rule. See id.
145. Id. at 626.
146. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 647. Koh suggests such examples
as "Eleanor Roosevelt, Jesse Jackson, the Dalai Lama, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and Princess
Diana." Id. at 648.
147. Id. at 642; Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 14, at 2646.
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legislature may enact legislation, a court may issue a holding, an executive
may issue an order, or a bureaucracy may adopt regulations. The rules
increasingly become binding as a matter of domestic law. As these
interactions are repeated, adherence to these rules becomes increasingly
commonplace, and the rules are increasingly internalized by the actors.
"Through this repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization-the transnational legal process-international law acquires
its 'stickiness,' and nations come to 'obey' out of perceived self-interest that
becomes institutional habit.',14s "By domesticating international rules,
transnational legal process can spur internal acceptance even of previously
taboo political principles." 
49
It is worth noting that the internalization of a particular international
norm is not the same as acceptance that the norm is right. For some, this
process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization may persuade
them that the underlying norm is normatively valuable. Others may have no
opinion about the value of the rule, following it simply as a matter of habit.
Still others may only internalize the fact that the norm is widely accepted by
others. 50 They may follow the rule because they have internalized a fear of
the reputational harm or other negative consequences that could result
from noncompliance.
5
'
The complicated story of the international prohibition against torture
and its slow internalization into the American legal consciousness provides a
useful illustration of this theory in practice. In 1979, the Filartiga family
brought an action in the Eastern District of New York against the one-time
Inspector General of the Paraguayan police, Americo Norberto Pefia-Irala,
for torturing and killing Joelito Filartiga in Paraguay. 52 With the assistance
of human rights NGOs, including the Center for Constitutional Rights
("CCR"),' 53 the Filartigas argued that torture was a violation of international
law and that the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") 54 gave the court
148. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 655; see also id. at 642 ("Repeated
participation in the transnational legal process is thus a constructivist activity, which helps to
reconstruct the national interests of the participating nations.").
149. Id. at 643.
150. See Goodman &Jinks, Socialization and International Human Rights Law, supra note 10, at
626 (describing "behavioral changes through pressures to assimilate-some imposed by other
actors and some imposed by the self").
151. See id.; see also Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, supra note 135, at 124-27
(explaining how customary international law can result from a belief that non-compliance with
a rule will be met by sanction, including harm to a state's reputation).
152. See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 664.
153. Id.
154. The ATCA, an obscure 1789 statute, grants the U.S. district courts "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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jurisdiction to hear such cases, even when both the plaintiffs and defendants
are foreign citizens.
Although the United States was a party to the Geneva Conventions,
which outlawed the use of torture in war,155 the United States had not yet
ratified the ICCPR or the Convention Against Torture, the two main treaties
prohibiting torture.156 Nonetheless, in a landmark decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held for the Filartigas. 57
Looking at a variety of sources, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, various U.N. General Assembly Resolutions, the unratified
ICCPR, 15 8 and an amicus brief submitted by the U.S. Departments of State
and Justice, the court found that "official torture is now prohibited by the
law of nations " 159 and that the ATCA gave the federal courts jurisdiction to
hear such claims.
160
The Filartiga opinion was immediately described as a "landmark"16' and
as "an important milestone in the international enforcement of basic human
rights." 162 It was predicted that the decision would "no doubt ... appear in
textbooks." 63 But not everyone agreed with the court's "expansive view of
international law," 64 and some worried "that Filartiga may be more of an
155. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 17, opened
for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ("No physical or mental torture, nor
any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatever."); see also Common Article III to all four Geneva
Conventions, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 2871; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
156. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment arts. 2(1), 4(1), adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEc. Doc. NO. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR ] ("No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.").
157. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
158. The use of U.N. declarations and unratified treaties was itself revolutionary and
controversial. See Rusk, supra note 28, at 311 (criticizing their use).
159. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
160. Id. at 887.
161. C. Donald Johnson, Jr., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A Contribution to the Development of
Customary International Law by a Domestic Court, 11 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 335 (1981).
162. Louis B. Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations, 11 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307,
307 (1981).
163. Josef Rohlik, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: International Justice in a Modern American Court?, 11
GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 330 (1981).
164. Sohn, supra note 162, at 307.
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aberration than an innovation. Such negative predictions soon proved
untrue. "After an initially ambivalent reception, the Second Circuit's
decision soon attained a strong and diverse following. " '" Despite some
continuing skepticism, its legal principles came to be supported by the
"Executive Branch, the American Law Institute, and the American Bar
Association." 6 7 "In the legal academy, Filartiga met with a similarly warm
reception. " "" Most of all, its logic was slowly adopted by other courts, which
agreed that official torture was a violation of international law.'69
The movement in the academy and courts soon migrated to other parts
of the government. By 1990, NGO lobbying helped convince the President
and Senate to ratify the Convention Against Torture,'7 0 and in 1992 the
United States finally ratified the ICCPR. 17 1 Congress took further action in
1992, passing the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"). 172 The House
165. Johnson, supra note 161, at 340-41. At least one commentator, skeptical of the Second
Circuit's determination that torture was a violation of international law, wrote:
The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the Filartiga case probably
will not stand as a landmark case with far-reaching implications for the
development of international law. It is more likely to find its place as a legal oddity
picked up in "but see.. ." footnotes by diligent scholars.
Rusk, supra note 28, at 311.
166. Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga s Strong Footing: International Human Rights
and the Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463, 466 (1997).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[I]t would be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture violate
customary international law."); Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting the law of nations prohibits official
torture); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding that "official
torture constitutes a cognizable violation of the law of nations"). Although the three concurring
judges in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rejected the ATCA
claim, two of the three wrote that official torture was a violation of international law. See id. at
777, 788 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 819-20 (Bork,J., concurring).
Interestingly, the number of courts citing torture as a violation of international law
and jus cogens norm has increased in each decade since Filartiga was decided. As a quick
illustration, an October 2007 Lexis search in the database "Federal & State Cases, Combined"
using the search-terms: "(torture and 'jus cogens') or (torture w/5 'violation of international
law')" yields four cases for the first decade following Filartiga, fifty-four cases for the decade
after that, and fifty-eight cases for the little more than half decade since 2001. Similarly
constructed searches yield similar proportions.
170. See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 665 (noting the Senate
ratified the convention in 1990).
171. The ICCPR was originally submitted to the Senate for ratification in 1978. See David
Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human
Rights Treaties, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 129, 132 (1999).
172. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)). Passed as an amendment to the ATCA, the TVPA was meant both to
fulfill the United States' obligations under the Convention Against Torture and to codify the
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and Senate Reports on the bill that became the TVPA expressed "general
approval" for Filartiga,173 explaining that "[w]hile the Alien Tort Claims Act
provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA would extend a civil remedy also
to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad."
7 4
Despite these developments, the Filartiga line of cases remained on
unsure footing1 75 prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004 opinion in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.176 In that case, the Court declined to specify exactly which
international law claims would provide a cause of action and jurisdiction
under the ATCAt7 7 but did endorse both Filartiga's logic and its assessment
that torture was a violation of international law actionable under the
ATCA. 17 A subsequent congressional attempt to narrow the range of claims
under the ATCA 17 would have allowed claims for torture to continue as
before.' 0
Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 166, at 513; see also Koh,
Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 665-66 (explaining that the TVPA "was
designed specifically to supplement and complement the pre-existing scope of the ATCA").
173. Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ARIZ.J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 271, 283 (1994) (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991) and S. REP. No. 102-249,
at 4-5 (1991)).
174. Id.
175. Some scholars still questioned whether the ATCA could provide a federal court with
jurisdiction over these types of claims. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815,
821 (1997); A. M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALEJ. INT'L L.
1, 8-12 (1995).
176. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
177. See David D. Caron & Brad R. Roth, Scope of Alien Tort Statute-Arbitrary Arrest and
Detention as Violations of Custom, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 803 (2004) ("The precise consequences
of Sosa for future Filartiga litigation are unclear."); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and
Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 273, 281-90
(2006).
178. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 ("The position we take today has been assumed by some federal
courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(CA2 1980) ... ."). The Court further noted:
This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the reasoning of
many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this Court.
[citing Filartiga, supra, at 890] ("[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind") ....
Id. at 732; see also id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that the ATCA be limited to a
"subset [that] includes torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes," for which
universal jurisdiction has been established).
179. Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, Senator (D. Cal.), Senator Feinstein Seeks to Clarify
Adjudication of Foreign Lawsuits in U.S. Federal Court (Oct. 18, 2005), available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/05releases/r-alientort.htm. Senator Feinstein stated:
Right now, courts are essentially adrift in terms of being able to pinpoint the
underlying meaning, scope and intent of the Alien Tort Statute. I hope this
legislation will settle the questions that surround this 200-year-old law by providing
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As suggested by transnational legal process, this story describes a
process whereby the international prohibition against torture is interpreted
and internalized through the interactions of different domestic actors. The
story begins with the norm entrepreneurs, the Filartiga family, and CCR,
forcing the issue into a law-making forum-the federal courts. Through
repeated interactions, the rule winds its way from the courts, to the
executive, to Congress, and back. After each interaction, the rule seems
more natural and more deeply internalized. As Koh explains, the repeated
pronouncement of the rule by courts convinced the executive and Congress
to ratify the Convention Against Torture. "The key argument made in
support of ratification was that the Convention would work no significant
changes in U.S. law, which had now significantly internalized the norm
against torture."'8 '
This type of interaction is repeated multiple times. Congress passed the
TVPA to protect and ratify the rights first established in Filartiga. s 2 In turn,
the Supreme Court turned to the TVPA as proof of the rule's strength.
8 3
Rather than focusing on the unitary role of the executive in negotiating
treaties, the story suggests-as Koh predicts-that political internalization,
social internalization, and judicial internalization may move at different
paces and in different orders, while at the same time interacting with each
other.8 4
Recent debates over torture and the war on terror, although
complicating this story, have actually followed the same trends. Revelations
of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Afghanistan have
brought the United States' commitment to the international prohibition
against torture into question.' 85 So too have 2002 and 2003 memos prepared
by the Bush Administration's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") granting the
President significant latitude to use coercive tactics 186 and suggesting that
a reasonable legal means that both plaintiffs and defendants can rely on to litigate
their differences.
Id.
180. Id. ("Specifically, the measure would: ... [c]odify international claims under the Alien
Tort law to include genocide, torture, slavery and slave trade, extrajudicial killing, and piracy;
[and] [e]xpand on existing statutory law, the Torture Victim Protection Act . .
181. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 665.
182. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
183. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 ("Congress, however, has not only expressed no disagreement
with our view of the proper exercise of the judicial power, but has responded to its most notable
instance by enacting legislation supplementing the judicial determination in some detail.").
184. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 642-43.
185. See, e.g., Phillip Carter, The Road to Abu Ghraib, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 2004, at 20.
186. See Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 34; see a/soJeremy
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681,
1703-08 (2005).
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the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. 1 7
These events, however, should not be observed in a vacuum. As Koh
suggests, the State Department and military bureaucracies, those parts of the
government that have engaged the prohibition and treaty rules the longest,
have fought consistently against the use of coercive interrogation.8 8 The
OLC's suggestion that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the war in
Afghanistan met immediate opposition from the State Department,18 9 and
the White House eventually announced that although the Taliban and Al
Qaeda fighters would not be granted prisoner of war status, the Geneva
Conventions would apply to the war in Afghanistan.' 9° The authorization of
coercive interrogation tactics met consistent, serious opposition from
military lawyers.' 91 By October 2003, a new head of the OLC was already
rethinking the previous memos, informing the Defense Department that at
least one of the earlier OLC memos was "under review" and could no longer
be relied on. 192 A second "torture" memo was disavowed soon after.1
93
News of prisoner abuse and torture memos produced similar reactions
outside the Administration. The immediate public reaction was highly
187. SeeJohn Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 30-32.
188. See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 650-51. As Koh explains:
To avoid such cascading violations, domestic bureaucracies develop "institutional
habits" that lead them into default patterns of compliance. These patterns act like
riverbeds that channel routine governmental conduct along law-compliant
pathways. When a nation deviates from that pattern of presumptive compliance,
frictions are created, not just in the particular issue area in which the first
deviation occurs, but in the whole spectrum of interlinked issue areas. To avoid
such frictions in its continuing interactions, a nation's bureaucracies gain powerful
institutional incentives to press their governmental leaders to adhere generally to
policies of compliance over policies of violation.
Id. at 654-55 (internal citations omitted); see also Barry et al., supra note 187, at 32 ("While the
CIA could do pretty much what it liked.., the Pentagon was bound by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. Military officers were routinely trained to observe the Geneva Conventions.").
For a recent description of the battle against torture within the U.S. military, seeJane Mayer,
How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27,
2006, at 32.
189. The State Department's Chief Legal Advisor William Howard Taft IV responded
quickly, describing the OLC memo as "seriously flawed" and its reasoning as "incorrect as well
as incomplete." R. Jeffrey Smith, Lawyer for State Dept. Disputed Detainee Memo; Military Legal
Advisers Also Questioned Tactics, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at A7. Secretary of State Colin Powell
"'requested that [the President] reconsider that decision,'" arguing that declaring the Geneva
Conventions nonapplicable "'will reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice'" and carry
"'a high cost in terms of negative international reaction.'" Barry et al., supra note 187, at 28-29
(quoting memos from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Secreatry of State Colin Powell
to President George W. Bush).
190. Barry et al., supra note 187, at 28-29; see also Smith, supra note 189, at A7.
191. See Barry et al., supra note 187, at 32.
192. Klaidman et al., supra note 186, at 34.
193. See id.
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condemnatory,19 4 with some even questioning the legal ethics of the
Administration lawyers who wrote the memos. 9 5 Congress also reacted
negatively. Despite strong opposition from the Vice President and the
possibility of a presidential veto,19 6  Congress eventually passed an
amendment to the defense-appropriations bill prohibiting Americans from
engaging in torture.
7
Throughout, the story remains one of process, of different actors-the
White House, the Justice Department, the Pentagon, the State Department,
Congress, the media-interacting and debating the prohibition against
• -198
torture. Through these interactions the rule is defined and internalized.
Other examples of this process cited by Koh and others include the
increased recognition of an international ban on landmines,'9 9 the use of
194. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., The Torture Memos: Putting the President Above the Law, 36 NAT'L
J. 1835, 1835 (2004); Rebecca Carr, Ashcroft, Under Fire, Says Torture Isn't Policy, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., June 9, 2004, at IA; What on Earth Were They Thinking?: The Bush Administration and the
Torture Memo, ECONOMIST,June 19, 2004, at 31.
195. Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning, AM. LAW., July 2004, at 65-66; Adam Liptak, How
Far Can a Government Lawryer Go, N.Y. TIMES,June 27, 2004, § 4, at 3.
196. Eric Schmitt, Cheney Working to Block Legislation on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, §
1, at 23.
197. Eric Schmitt, President Backs McCain on Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; Eric
Schmitt, Senate Moves to Protect Military Prisoners Despite Veto Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at
A22 ("In a sharp rebuke to the White House, the Senate overwhelmingly agreed Wednesday to
regulate the detention, interrogation and treatment of prisoners held by the American
military."). The President eventually did sign the amendment into law at the end of 2005 but
added a signing statement "that the administration would interpret the amendment 'in a
manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the president to supervise the unitary
executive branch and as commander-in-chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations
on judicial power.'" Elizabeth Bumiller, White House Letter, For President, Final Say on a Bill
Sometimes Comes After the Signing, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 16, 2006, at All (quoting Statement on Signing
the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30,
2005)).
The subsequent passage of the Military Commissions Act is much harder to interpret
and may put this story in a more negative light. Although the Act reiterates a ban on torture, it
seems to leave the President considerable room to interpret what counts. It also seems to trade
a ban on torture for a validation of torture that already occurred. The Act is extraordinarily
complicated though, and it is unclear how it has been interpreted by the public. See, e.g., Scott
Shane & Adam Liptak, Shifting Power to a President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at Al ("Public
commentary on the bill, called the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been fast-shifting and
often contradictory, partly because its 96 pages cover so much ground and because the impact
of some provisions is open to debate.").
198. Koh's theory also helps explain the messiness of the debate-some rules regarding
torture may have been more deeply internalized than others. Thus, although a general
prohibition may have been internalized, its full scope may not. For example, non-derogation, a
principle recognized in the ICCPR and Convention Against Torture, remains more contested.
See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING
TO THE CHALLENGE 132-63 (2002).
199. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at 655-63.
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the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights to force debate over the death
penalty,2° ° and the role of NGOs in responding to the mass expulsion of
201
Haitians from the Dominican Republic.
2. Law as Legitimacy
A different, but perhaps complementary model of international law is
202
suggested by Thomas Franck's theory of law as legitimacy. Franck has
argued that relative compliance with rules of international law results, at
least in part, from the perceived legitimacy of particular rules. 203 The
perceived legitimacy of international law rules "will vary in degree from rule
to rule and time to time,"'2°4 and where particular rules are seen as
legitimate, they will exert greater "compliance pull" and be "harder to
disobey.",25
For Franck, legitimacy is a matter of "right process." Franck identifies
four main factors that indicate a rule's legitimacy: "determinacy, symbolic
validation, coherence, and adherence (to a normative hierarchy) .2°6 The first,
determinacy, involves the clarity and specificity of the rule. A rule's
"determinacy depends upon the clarity with which it is able to communicate
its intent and to shape that intent into a specific situational command."
20 7
States are more likely to follow clear, specific rules, than vague, unclear
ones.208 Symbolic validation involves the various cues and rituals a legal
system uses to indicate the legitimacy of particular rules. It also involves the
pedigree of the rule. Essentially, symbolic validation measures the apparent
authority invested in the rule and the perceived legitimacy of the rule's
birth. Coherence involves treating like cases alike, while adherence
measures the extent to which rules fit within an organized system of rules.
One might elaborate on this list to suggest other factors.20 0 Pedigree
suggests a role for the perceived fairness of the negotiating process-
including, for example, the transparency of the process and participation in
200. Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights Law, 34 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 412-16 (2006).
201. Arturo J. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of Human Rights
Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 527, 561-62 (2004).
202. See generally Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7.
203. Id. at 706 ("This essay posits that, in a community organized around rules, compliance
is secured-to whatever degree it is--at least in part by perception of a rule as legitimate by
those to whom it is addressed.").
204. Id.
205. Id. at 708.
206. Id. at 712.
207. Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 725.
208. Id. at 719 ("When determinacy is absent, it is unlikely that states will have
compunctions about not complying with the rule. Indeed, some rules are likely written with low
determinacy so that noncompliance will be easy.").
209. These are not factors laid out by Franck.
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the process-in determining a rule's legitimacy. Determinacy suggests a role
for other factors related to a state's intent to be bound, including the
recognition of enforcement mechanisms within a given treaty.210 Greater
determinacy generates greater "compliance pull," at least in part, because
clearer, more specific rules demonstrate stronger agreement over the rule to
be followed and a greater recognition that noncompliance can be met with
reprisals."' Vague rules are easy to argue with, may indicate little agreement
about the rule's content, and, given the difficulty of identifying
noncompliance, are difficult to enforce.
The theory can thus explain why newer rules like those described in the
ICCPR may generate less compliance than older rules like those governing
212the rights of ambassadors or jurisdiction over captured ships at sea. Older
rules are likely to have developed both greater determinacy and detail and
the pedigree that comes from a long tradition. The scope of newer rules
guaranteeing, for example, freedom of speech, might remain less defined.1 3
The theory can also explain why a detailed, heavily negotiated, face-to-face,
bilateral trade treaty may generate more compliance than a vague
multilateral human rights treaty.
Turning back to the torture example used above, Franck's theory of
legitimacy might help explain why the Geneva Conventions and not the
ICCPR or the Convention Against Torture provided such a powerful focal
point for arguments against the administration's positions on torture. 2 14 All
three prohibit torture, but the Geneva Conventions, negotiated by states to
coordinate their actions, possessing a high level of determinacy and a strong
215pedigree, and carrying the powerful incentive of reciprocity, seemed to
carry much stronger "compliance pull."
210. This would also be true of the enforcement mechanisms associated with a given
custom.
211. More determinate rules also facilitate compliance by clarifying the actions a
government need take or avoid.
212. SeeFranck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 717.
213. See GerryJ. Simpson, Is International Law Fair?, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 615, 629 (1996)
(reviewing FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 15) ("Free speech doctrine in international law is in a
similar state, lacking the determinacy and coherence that Franck deems necessary for founding
a legitimate and mature rule of international law.").
214. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 718 (describing the rules governing the
.treatment of war prisoners" as having a high degree of determinacy).
215. A February 2006 Lexis search under "News, All (English-Full Text)" is revealing. A
search for the terms "United States" and "Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" and "Torture
Memo" yielded eight articles. The terms "United States" and "Convention Against Torture" and
"Torture Memo" yielded eighty-five articles. When the same search was run with "Geneva
Conventions," 385 stories appeared. Similarly constructed searches yielded similar results.
93 IOWA LAWREVIEW
3. Toward a New Doctrine of Sources
Although Koh's and Franck's theories are different-Franck's is
backward-looking, focusing on the process leading to the enactment of
particular rules, while Koh's theory is set in the present, focusing on how
rules can be actively internalized and greater compliance generated-the
two theories can be seen as complementary. The legitimating factors cited by
Franck involve the perceived legitimacy of particular rules. Together, these
factors might be incorporated into Koh's theory as internalized norms of
international rulemaking. Moreover, by explaining how and when states
come to accept the legitimacy of international rules, both theories begin to
explain that mysterious element of international law, opinio juris. These
theories provide a window into the alchemy that converts ad hoc, practical
coordination and international moral thinking into international law. As the
next part suggests, they may suggest a different conception of international
law's sources, one capable of dealing with the challenges posed in Part II.
IV. A NEw DOCTRINE OF SOURCES?
A. LOOKING FOR LAWINALL THE WRONG PLACES
It is time to rethink what actually constitutes law in the international
system. The current doctrine of sources tells us that treaties are international
law, but empirical evidence indicates that treaties are often poor predictors
216of state practice. Some states ratify treaties but do not fulfill their
requirements; others refuse to ratify but scrupulously abide by the treaties'
217rules. At the same time, changes in the international system have eroded
the force of positivism and the theoretical equivalence between treaties and
international law. 2"' The expansion of the international community, the rise
of human rights, and the international system's need to adapt to changing
circumstances have all put pressure on the reified role of "treaty" in
identifying rules of international law.219
Koh's and Franck's theories, described in the previous Part, present a
different model.22° They suggest that what gives a particular rule of
international law its force is the strength of the norms underlying it.22' The
more these norms are internalized by states-or by transnational and
216. See supra Part l.D.
217. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part III.A.
219. See supra Part III.A.1.
220. See supra Part I.A.
221. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 706-12 (explaining how a rule's perceived
legitimacy helps generate compliance); Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 7, at
626-33 (tracing how norm-internalization results in states obeying international law).
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222domestic actors-the more likely they are to influence state actions.
Where the term "international law" is attached to strongly internalized
norms, that term will carry greater weight and authority than where it is not.
Although Koh's and Franck's theories are meant to answer questions about
223ihow international law exerts its force and why states obey, they also suggest
an alternative model of what the rules are and where to find them. In fact, if
these theories are correct and international law exerts its force in the way
that they suggest, it would be anachronistic to look for the rules in formal
sources like treaties rather than in evidence of norm internalization and
process.
This Part draws upon these lessons to suggest a revised doctrine of
sources for identifying rules of international law. The traditional hierarchy
of (1) treaties, (2) custom, and (3) general principles, with its focus on
formal sources and state consent, was designed to explain a turn-of-the-
twentieth-century world of few states and state-coordination treaties. It
systematized the way international law seemed to work at the time. But in a
world marked by a multiplicity of states and human rights treaties with deep
implications for the internal affairs of states, that hierarchy and those
sources no longer adequately describe how international law works. This
Part suggests a revised doctrine of sources capable of capturing both the
gaps presented by recent empirical works and the myriad ways in which
224international law is followed on a daily basis. Instead of focusing on the
presence of formal sources like treaties, this new doctrine of sources focuses
on the strength of the norms underlying a particular rule of either treaty or
customary international law. The hope is that such a doctrine can explain
both why treaties were such strong proxies for international law in
Oppenheim's time and why they may no longer be today.
The next few Sections lay out a new hierarchy of sources. They explain
the analysis that would be required to determine the presence of an
international law rule and how the new doctrine of sources might answer
some of the concerns laid out in Part II. Part IV concludes by considering
222. This could be either because the actors in question have themselves internalized the
norm or because the actors (even if they disagree with the norm in question) know that others
with influence or power have internalized that norm.
223. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 705 (explaining that "[t]his essay attempts a
study of why states obey laws in the absence of coercion" and differentiating it from "studies
that investigate the sources of normative obligation" and which "focus on the origins of rules-
in treaties, custom, decisions of tribunals, opiniojuris, state conduct, resolutions of international
organizations, and so forth").
224. See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 47; see also HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 250 (2d ed. 1954) ("[T]o deny that
international law exists at all as a system of binding legal rules flies in the face of all the
evidence."); Franck, Legitimay, supra note 7, at 705 (observing "a pregnant phenomenon: that
most states observe systemic rules much of the time in their relations with other states").
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how the new doctrine of sources would impact different aspects of
international law.
B. A NEW HIERARCHY
The new doctrine of sources suggested here focuses on a question of
international social fact. It seeks to explain which rules are actually treated
as law in the international system . This doctrine thus inverts the usual
hierarchy of sources. Opinio juris, previously used only as evidence that
customary practice had achieved the status of law, is now the main focus of
inquiry and the theoretical touchstone of all international law. Both treaties
and custom are subordinate to it, providing evidence of opinio juris's
presence. Accordingly, where the orthodox doctrine of sources created a
hierarchy of sources based on relative formality and consent, this new
doctrine takes a cue from Koh and Franck and focuses on how deeply
126internalized a particular rule and its legitimacy have become. Instead of
focusing on the presence of a treaty or a custom, it looks at the relative
strength of the norms undergirding them. The most deeply internalized
international norms, those most clearly treated as law, would come first,
followed by those rules built on their foundation.
The new hierarchy would look something like this:
1. Core International Law
a. Process Values
b. Internalized Norms
2. Legitimated Rules
a. Legitimated Treaties
b. Recognized Custom
3. Aspirational International Law
225. In this sense, the doctrine of sources described here is somewhat Hartian, suggesting
that the key question in determining what the law is in any instance is what rules are treated as
law as a matter of social fact in the international system. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (developing a theory of law based on observation of social fact). The
question here is not what doctrine of sources would produce the most legitimate or most
normatively appealing law but, instead, what doctrine of sources would most accurately reflect
the rules currently treated as law by international actors. See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Socio-
Legal Positivism and a GeneralJurisprudence, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001) (adapting legal
positivism to incorporate a wider variety of social practices into the concept of law). One could
start from a different position, asserting a theory of legitimacy or of justice and developing a
doctrine of sources best equipped to discover rules that meet those criteria. The rules identified
by such alternative doctrines might not be the same as those currently treated as law by states.
Although such projects have their appeal and may suggest a normatively preferable conception
of international law, they are beyond the focus of this Article.
226. See supra Parts III.A. 1-2.
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1. Core International Law
The strongest international law under this new hierarchy would be a
group of core international norms. That group would consist of two
different kinds of customary norms deeply internalized within the
international system. The first group would be Process Values. These are
rules about making rules. Drawing on Franck's theory of international law as
legitimacy, this group would include various deeply internalized norms
about how legitimate rules of international law are made. It would include
factors like consistency, determinacy, predictability, and fair negotiating
process that make a particular agreed-upon rule legitimate. It may also
include factors that demonstrate states' intent to be bound, including the
seriousness of negotiation... and the willingness to accept enforcement
mechanisms. The second category of Core International Law would be
Internalized Norms-a group of core substantive norms that have been
widely and deeply internalized by states and other actors and which might
almost be described as a core international morality. Jus cogens norms228
(e.g., prohibitions on slavery, piracy, genocide, and probably torture) would
be included in this group.229 This group would also include some of the
oldest background principles of international law, such as pacta sunt servanda
and rebus sic stantibus.2 30
227. Accession of a large group of states known for human rights violations to a human
rights treaty without attaching any RUDs might be probative evidence that those states have no
intention of being bound, especially where liberal democracies attach many. Cf GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 1, at 127-28 (drawing similar inferences from patterns of RUDs). The
presence of many RUDs may contrastingly indicate a much stronger intent and expectation of
being bound.
228. Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms of customary international law that states
cannot contract around by treaty. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999) (defining jus
cogens as "a mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or more nations
may exempt themselves or release one another").
229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 cmt. n (1987) (counting all of these
as jus cogen norms); Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 554, 571 (1995) (discussing "torture, which is widely regarded as a jus cogens norm of
general international law"). An important caveat is that although a particular norm may have
achieved the status of an Internalized Norm, the scope of that norm may be neither
internalized nor uncontested. Torture provides an example. Torture has arguably achieved the
status of both jus cogens and an Internalized Norm, but the current debates over it may indicate
that the scope of the rule is still undetermined. Various treaties prohibiting torture include
non-derogation provisions; debate over possible exceptions to the rule against torture may be
evidence that at least that principle has not been internalized. Of course, calls for exceptions to
the rule against torture may simply be calls to violate the rule.
230. It might be asked how pacta sunt servanda could survive a relative de-emphasizing of
treaties. If treaties are no longer de facto international law, it would seem that the principle that
states are bound by their agreements must also suffer. This Article suggests that the gap
between treaties and accession is not a failure of pacta sunt servanda but, instead, the result of
the growing gap between what treaties require and what states think they are agreeing to do.
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2. Legitimated Rules
The next strongest type of international law would be a group that
includes Legitimated Treaties and Recognized Custom. Building on
Franck's insights about the power of legitimate process, this category would
include treaties and custom supported by strong Process Values and, thus,
imbued with significant legitimacy. Treaties in this category would have the
force of international law because the binding nature of the treaty, arising as• I. /231
it does from fulfilled Process Values, has been completely internalized.
Such agreements would count as law, not because of the particular rules
they describe, nor because they are treaties, but instead because they exhibit
the level of pedigree, determinacy, and seriousness necessary to convince
international actors that they were meant to be legally binding.232 This
category would thus include a wide variety of well-known bilateral and
multilateral treaties, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
the Geneva Conventions, and the Vienna Treaty on Consular Relations. 233 It
231. Thus, although consent is no longer the theoretical basis for the doctrine of sources, it
would be wrong to conclude that states would not be bound by their commitments. Where
states have followed Process Values in negotiating a treaty, the new doctrine of sources will treat
their ratification as a binding legal commitment.
One could thus introduce an element of consent even within the new doctrine. One
could explain Legitimated Treaties as resting on an internalized norm that valid consent to a
treaty makes that treaty binding law for the ratifying parties. Process Values could be
understood as the elements of valid consent. Although such a formulation has the benefit of
hewing closer to ordinary ideas about treaty formation, such a formulation risks confusion
regarding the actual role of consent in the new doctrine; thus, this Article avoids its use.
232. Their legitimacy is, thus, not tied to the normative strength of the rules they lay out. In
many cases, the subject matter of the treaty may have no normative content at all; the treaty
might set out rules for bilateral investment, rules governing the specific treatment of
ambassadors, or rules regarding how ships should pass at sea. This is not to suggest that these
types of treaties never have normative content. Rules about fair trade, intellectual property, or
ownership of local resources may entrench certain normative perspectives; such agreements
may even be fraught with disagreements over values. The point, though, is that these treaties
are treated as law because of the process behind them and not any normative content they may
or may not have.
233. See Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 717. Franck states:
It happens-by way of contrast-that, in international practice, the rules
protecting diplomats, as codified by the Vienna Convention, have a very high
degree of specificity, and they are almost invariably obeyed. So, too, are the highly
specific rules, in another Vienna Convention, on the making, interpretation, and
obligation of treaties. Among other subjects covered by determinate rules that
exert a strong pull to compliance and, in practice, elicit a high degree of
conforming behavior by states are jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas,
territorial waters and ports, jurisdiction over aircraft, copyright and trademarks,
and international usage of posts, telegraphs, telephones and radio waves. There is
also a high degree of determinacy in the rules governing embassy property, rights
of passage of naval vessels in peacetime, treatment of war prisoners and the duty of
governments to pay compensation-even if not as to the measure of that
compensation-for the expropriation of property belonging to aliens.
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would also explain the continuing vitality of the traditional doctrine of
sources and its emphasis on treaties. Many treaties are backed by strong
Process Values, and their binding nature on states has been accepted and
internalized.2 34 For the average treaty, the status of law might be presumed.
This second category would also include a group of Recognized
Custom. These would be customary rules that are backed by strong evidence
of general practice and opiniojuris, which repeatedly have been recognized
and restated as rules of customary international law. Such rules, like
Legitimated Treaties, would carry powerful pedigrees and high levels of
determinacy. Customary international law on treaty interpretation, the
treatment of ambassadors, and sovereign immunity would be examples of
235
rules falling in this category.
3. Aspirational International Law
The final category would be Aspirational International Law. This
category would include rules found in treaties (or in the rhetoric of
international lawyers) where the norm is not yet backed by opinio juris and
where the process leading to the treaty does not exert strong legitimacy pull.
These rules may remain vague, and enforcement mechanisms may seem
weak. Some of the treaties studied by Hathaway, like the ICCPR and the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, may fit this description. '36
Rather than reflecting deeply internalized norms, the rules would reflect
aspirations of some states and other international actors. Nonetheless, these
rules may be evidence that customary international law on the topic is in the
process of crystallizing.
Unlike the separate, self-contained categories of the traditional
doctrine, these three categories are best seen as points along a spectrum.
Many rules may lie somewhere between categories. Moreover, the same
processes that bring a rule into one category can also move it into another.
A rule of Aspirational International Law may become the source of advocacy
2317eventually leading to the internalization of the norm. . Similarly, even
Id. (internal citations omitted).
234. In a sense, this is where Process Values and the Internalized Norm of pacta sunt
servanda meet. The fulfillment of Process Values would create a Legitimated Treaty and bring
pacta sunt servanda into play. For a related discussion, see supra note 231 and accompanying
text.
235. In an earlier era, this category might have included widely recognized rules of war, like
the law of prize. See, e.g., David Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution:
A Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 363, 384 (2003); Phillip R.
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 723-25 (1986).
236. See infra note 265. Some, myself included, might find relegating treaties like the ICCPR
and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women to this category distressing. The fact that
some of the rules listed in these treaties may not yet be "law" does not, however, deny either
their moral force or the international lawyer's responsibility to seek their general recognition.
237. For an example of how this can occur, see supra notes 152-84 and accompanying text.
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where Process Values were originally not met, longstanding recognition of a
treaty may grant that treaty pedigree, instill it with legitimacy, and in turn,
grant it the status of law. A Legitimated Treaty, in turn, may become so
deeply a part of international law rhetoric that a previously neutral, non-
normative rule within it begins to appear normatively preferred.23 s
C. FINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE NEWDOCTRIm OF SouRCEs
1. Evidence of International Law
As explained above, the key determinant of international law under this
new doctrine of sources is the presence of internalized norms.239
Determining whether a certain rule of international law exists thus requires
a careful investigation into the presence of opiniojuris. In a sense, the new
doctrine described here extends part of the longstanding method for
finding customary international law to all international law rules,4 whether
written or unwritten and regardless of the type of source-custom, treaty, or
non-binding declaration.
In examining any potential rule of international law, the primary
question is whether the rule is or would be treated as law by the international
community. The question is not whether the rule is universally followed, nor
is it whether every state agrees with the content of the rule. Instead, the
question is whether states have generally internalized the presence of
international law. Sometimes, the internalization of a norm as a legal rule
may involve the state accepting that a certain action is right or wrong. It is
sufficient, however, that a state internalizes the fact that an action has
become outlawed or legally required. What is required is an internalization
of how the rule is treated within the system, not an acceptance of values
underlying it. 24 1 People pay their taxes even if they believe them to be unfair.
238. See HART, supra note 225, at 229 ("So it is possible, although difficult, to imagine that
men ... might come to attach moral importance to driving on the left instead of the right of the
road .... ")
239. See supra Part IV.B. 1.
240. It is important to note, however, that although this method would look to opiniojuris,
it would do so for different reasons than the traditional positivist doctrine would suggest.
Whereas earlier doctrine looked to opinio juris as proof of consent-namely that states agreed
that a rule was "law"-this method would look to opiniojuris as proof of a sociological fact-that
states treat the rule as "law." See HART, supra note 225, at 226 (criticizing the "threadbare"
quality of a theory based on consent).
241. See generally Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, supra note 135 (discussing a
reputation-based theory of customary international law). Guzman suggests another useful way
to think about this question. He turns the inquiry around, asking not what a particular state
thinks about a particular rule, but what a state thinks other states think about a particular rule.
Id. If a state believes that its actions would be seen as unlawful by other states and could subject
it to sanction or rebuke, then that state believes there to be a rule of international law. Id.
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This question is thus distinct from whether a rule is complied with. The
decision whether to comply with a particular rule involves the balancing of
various interests, costs, and benefits. The fact that a rule is treated as law
should be one factor weighing on the side of compliance. This may be
because of a generalized desire to be law-abiding, an internalization of the
value of the legal rule, or a fear of the repercussions that may follow if others
see the rule as law. Even where these interests are present, however, they
may not be strong enough to outweigh other concerns. In the domestic
context, many people drive faster than the speed limit. Most, however, likely
accept that the speed limit is the law. Instead, their non-compliance is the
result of a complicated calculus that includes their desire to get somewhere
faster, the relative likelihood of getting caught, and the costliness of a ticket.
A similar sort of calculus likely takes place when a state decides to violate a
rule of international law to pursue what it believes to be a matter of national
security.2 42 The question here is whether a rule is playing the role of law in
243states' calculus, not whether it is eventually followed.
Another important note is that the question is one about the status of
the rule across the international community, not in the view of a particular
state. As discussed in Part IV.E.2, where a state has been accused of violating
a rule of international law, the key question will not be whether that state
thought the rule was legally binding (except insofar as it provides clues to
international consensus), but whether other states, reflecting international
consensus, would treat the rule as legally binding.
Evidence that a rule is treated these ways can be found in a variety of
forms and places. A widespread custom, a non-binding declaration, or a
treaty may all provide evidence of what is treated as law by international
244actors. But the doctrine is open to other forms of evidence as well. As
norm internalization is a process involving a coterie of different actors
including judges, legislators, NGOs, and the media, evidence of their views
in domestic and international court decisions, public opinion polls, and
media reaction is useful as well. Any evidence of opiniojuris is probative. Of
242. See Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 6, at 1883-86.
243. This may be hard to observe, but evidence that a rule is treated as law may be visible in
how rules are described and discussed in various contexts. How do states describe the rule when
they explain their signature on treaties or when they pass legislation to enact it into domestic
law? How do states react to noncompliance with the rule by other states? Do states use legal
terms, or more importantly specific legal terms, to describe the violation? Do states use legal
arguments to try to explain or excuse what might look like violations of the rule? Are sanctions
against a noncompliant state seen as legitimate? Does violating the rule affect a state's
reputation for law-abidingness, making agreements with other states less likely or more
difficult?
244. Since the focus is on what states believe the law to be, neither a general course of
practice, as traditionally required by customary international law, nor a ratified treaty, as
traditionally required by treaty law, is required. Cf Guzman, Saving Customary International Law,
supra note 135, at 149 ("Practice, then, is best viewed as evidence of opiniojuris.").
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course, some forms of evidence will be more powerful than others in
determining whether a rule is ultimately accepted as international law; an
official pronouncement will be more probative than a newspaper article.245
As Andrew Guzman suggests, "Explicit state action that seems contrary to the
short-term interests of a state, and that is accompanied by claims that the
state is acting out of a sense of legal obligation, offers strong evidence of
opinio juri."24 6 Finding international law will require careful sifting through
evidence and careful consideration of its meaning. Admittedly, this is no
247
easy process.
2. Treaties as Evidence
The most important change under the proposed new doctrine of
sources would be in the role of treaties. Treaties would shift from
authoritative statements of the law to evidence of what the law requires. The
important question would no longer be the presence of a treaty but, instead,
the strength and nature of the norms underlying it.
The evidence provided by a treaty could nonetheless be quite powerful.
Where Process Values have been strongly fulfilled, the treaty itself will be
legitimated and become binding as a matter of international law.s A heavily
negotiated, highly specific treaty will be treated as law because of the process
that produced it and the qualities it exhibits. Determinate rather than vague
rules, clear means for determining violations, and the recognition of
particular sanctions regimes within the treaty itself would all be factors
which, if present, would suggest a treaty that states would treat as law. So too
245. Context matters in determining what evidence will be relevant in any given case. The
opinion of non-state actors may have little relevance in finding a rule concerning state-to-state
relations. It may be considerably more relevant in finding evidence of consensus on human
rights norms.
246. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, supra note 135, at 154. Other probative
evidence would be how a state justifies an apparent violation and how other states react to it. Do
states discuss the violation in legal terms? Do they refer to specific legal rules (more probative)
or appeal to international law more generally (less probative)? One might also look at
international reaction to the threat of sanctions against the offending state. Are such sanctions
treated as legitimate?
247. Id. at 126. As Guzman writes:
Even if one could resolve the above problems about what counts as practice and
the degree of consistency required, there remains the practical problem that
observing all relevant evidence from all relevant states will normally be impossible.
At the most mundane level, few nations document their actions and statements in
a way that allows for an investigation of their practices.
Id. (citing BYERS, supra note 50, at 144 n.119).
248. These Process Values are themselves international law because they have been
internalized by states and state actors. Accordingly, those rules could themselves change as new
rules are internalized and as old ones are forgotten. One could thus imagine a new Process
Value developing-for example, that any U.N. General Assembly resolution that passes by a
majority vote would be binding-if and when a consensus forms around such a rule.
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would evidence that the treaty's provisions had been carefully negotiated
and widely understood by the treaty's parties. Many, if not most, bilateral or
multilateral economic treaties would probably meet this test. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the legal status of such treaties might even be
taken for granted.
Even where the fulfillment of Process Values seems weaker, the treaty
may still provide evidence of what customary international law requires or of
an Internalized Norm of the international community. In such cases, one
would look at the treaty much as one currently looks at the nonbinding
declarations and unsigned treaties discussed in Part II.B. The treaty (1)
might be evidence of an attempt to codify custom or Internalized Norms,
(2) might be evidence that an Internalized Norm or custom is crystallizing,
or (3) may have been the focal point around which an Internalized Norm or
custom subsequently formed. 249 The main change from the old doctrine is
that this analysis would be necessary even where the relevant states had
ratified the treaty.
Where the rules described in a treaty involve Internalized Norms, the
treaty would reflect international law (but not necessarily create it). 250
Accordingly, the specific language of the treaty-although evidence of the
law's scope-may not be completely determinative of the law's content. The
rule described by the treaty may be broader or narrower than the
Internalized Norm. Debates over the exact scope of the international
prohibition against torture may demonstrate such a phenomenon. Although
the main treaties prohibiting torture explicitly forbid any derogation under
any circumstances, debate over possible exceptions (e.g. "the ticking time
bomb" situation) continues.2 5' Such an example suggests that when looking
to a treaty for evidence of Internalized Norms, treaty language will need to
be considered together with other evidence of opiniojuris.
These two possibilities-that a treaty may be legitimated by process or
may reflect Internalized Norms-are not mutually exclusive. In some cases, a
treaty may result both from strong Process Values and describe an
252Internalized Norm. The Geneva Conventions and the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties may be examples of treaties imbued with powerful
pedigree and determinacy that also reflect norms deeply internalized by the
international community.
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. Treaties would thus either be a product of opiniojuris or evidence of opiniojuris.
251. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 198, at 132-63.
252. Widespread obedience of a treaty could thus reflect either a Legitimated Treaty
backed by strong Process Values, an Internalized Norm (or Recognized Custom) recognized by
the treaty, or both.
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In some other cases, a treaty may be lacking in both Process Values and
253Internalized Norms. A vague treaty '- backed by deficient process may
describe norms that have not yet been internalized and that remain largely
aspirational. Such treaties can become powerful engines of norm
internalization; they may also develop pedigree and definition as they are
referenced and debated over time. Until that time, however, they will be no
more than Aspirational International Law and not properly considered
"law."
3. Treaties, Process, and Change
By converting treaties from statements of the law to evidence of the law,
the new doctrine of sources erases much of the difference between treaties
and other sources of international law. Under the old doctrine, treaties and
custom had been distinct types of international law with their own character,
rules, and methodology.254  Other sources, including non-binding
declarations and unratified treaties, were forced uneasily into one or both
categories. Under the new doctrine, however, treaties and custom become
part of the same phenomenon. Both serve as reflections of opinio juris,
evidence of what international society has accepted as law. Moreover, non-
binding declarations and unratified treaties fit easily into this group.
Different sources may carry different weight-treaties, bringing additional
solemnity and potential domestic effects, might provide stronger evidence
than other types of documents. Nonetheless, the new doctrine would put all
international law sources-custom, treaties, non-binding declarations, and
unratified treaties-on one theoretical and methodological continuum.
Treaties and custom would also no longer be distinguished by their
ability to change. The new doctrine focuses on process; treaties, instead of
standing outside that process, are now part of it. Treaties become data
points-snapshots of moments on the formation of international law. Just as
customary international law can change as general practice and apinio juris
shift, so too can the rules reflected in a treaty. Because the treaties would
rely on the underlying norms for their force as law, the rules they describe
can change as the norms do. If and when, for example, general practice and
opinio juris indicate that the meaning of the U.N. Charter's prohibition on
the use of force has shifted and that an exception has developed to allow
humanitarian intervention, the international law will have changed.255
253. It is important to note that a treaty could be a Legitimated Treaty even if it contains
vague terms if it contains determinate means to define those terms. Thus, for example, a treaty
with a vague requirement to protect the environment that also sets up a specific mechanism or
body to define the scope of that requirement might constitute a Legitimated Treaty.
254. See supra Part I.A.
255. But see supra Part II.C.
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The main difference between a treaty rule and a customary rule would
be in the definition and certainty of the rule being changed. Evidence of a
change in opinio juris would have to be strong enough to overcome the
higher level of definition and agreement the treaty might embody. The
hurdles to changing a Legitimated Treaty would be particularly high; the
whole point of the treaty is to lock-in rules. But one can imagine situations
where the regime (not simply the government) or the international system
has changed so dramatically that the legitimacy of the process carried out by
256previous entities should no longer bind present ones.
Finding evidence of what states "believe" has long been one of the most
difficult problems of customary international law.2 57 So too has the question
of how much evidence and how much consensus are needed to demonstrate
it.25s This Article does not resolve these issues. Admittedly, importing this
uncertainty 59 to all of international law may seem unsatisfying or
counterproductive. But with this uncertainty also comes subtlety. By focusing
on the process by which states come to recognize rules as international law,
the new doctrine of sources should better reflect and describe the law
actually governing the international system.
D. EXPLAINING THE GAPs
The potential increased accuracy of the revised doctrine of sources can
be seen in its ability to answer the challenges presented in Part II.260 The new
doctrine moves away from the positivist hierarchy's emphasis on consent, a
basis for the law that seems increasingly attenuated as the international
256. See Waldron, supra note 87, at 168-69, 171-72. Waldron suggests that East Germany's
post-Cold War argument that it was not bound by the Warsaw Pact and Turkey's post-World War
I argument that the capitulations regime no longer reflected international realities are
examples of just such changes. See id. at 169 ("To expect that a multilateral security treaty could
survive such changes is to live in cloud cuckoo land.").
257. See Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, supra note 135, at 157 (explaining that
"[b]ecause [customary international law] is formed by state beliefs, which are unobservable,
and actions, which can be interpreted in many ways, the process of identifying [customary
international law] is difficult and dependent on context" and asserting that "[w]hen this is
combined with the lack of a process to explicitly identify [customary international law] rules,
there is no way to avoid the vagueness of [customary international law]").
258. Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Revival of Customay Humanitarian Law, 99 AM.J.
INT'L L. 817, 817 (2005) (observing that "[e]xtensive scholarship addresses various aspects of
modern debates over the identification, application, and legal force of customary norms"). For
a critical assessment, see generallyJ. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customayy International Law, 40
VA.J. INT'L L. 449 (2000).
259. Customary international law does carry a certain amount of uncertainty. It is
important, however, not to overstate it. States have followed (and courts have identified)
customary international law for centuries. Even today, when many areas of international law
have been reduced to treaty, courts continue to find new rules of customary international law.
See Meron, supra note 258, at 817.
260. See supra Part II.
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community expands. Instead it looks to international social fact: what norms
have been internalized by the international community and what rules are
treated as binding. It brings treaties into the same dynamic process as
custom, thereby providing a mechanism for treaty rules to change. Focusing
on norm internalization also allows more voices to have a say in what
constitutes the law. As international law increasingly reaches into states and
touches individuals, so too does the revised doctrine ask how actors within
the state approach the rule.
It also helps explain the strange nature of Hathaway's findings.2 6'
Noncompliance with treaties by treaty-parties is only one aspect of
Hathaway's findings. What makes Hathaway's studies both disturbing and
interesting is the larger, seemingly perverse patterns of both compliance and
noncompliance. The traditional doctrine of sources seems as ill-equipped to
explain why the states that ratify treaties fail to follow their rules as it is to
explain why the states that do not ratify the treaties do, nonetheless, follow
them.
The new doctrine suggested here provides a different model. Seen
through its lens, Hathaway's findings no longer suggest the absence or
262thinness of international law, as Goldsmith and Posner argue. Instead,
Hathaway's findings suggest a system in which international norms are in the
process of crystallizing. Some of the treaties Hathaway studies may not be
backed by strong Process Values. They may describe rules that are too
vague26 3 and may demonstrate little expectation by the parties that their
provisions are to be enforced.2 64 Critics have at times suggested that the
ICCPR and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women suffer from a
261. See generally Hathaway, An Integrated Theory, supra note 4; supra Part II.D.
262. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 107-34. It is not exactly clear which-
thinness or nonexistence-they are suggesting. See also Part II.D.
263. As Douglas Donoho argues:
Perhaps the most fundamental weakness in the present human rights normative
framework is its continuing textual and interpretive indeterminacy. To varying
degrees depending upon the right, the catalogue of rights consists of extremely
vague, generally stated principles. Many important rights are described in highly
elastic terms such as rights to "equal protection of the law," "freedom of thought,"
"self-determination," "work," "just and favorable conditions of work," "an adequate
standard of living," and prohibitions against "discrimination." While some degree
of abstraction and general language is perhaps necessary to any multilateral
human rights treaty, such language provides little textual guidance as to a right's
specific content and meaning.
Douglas Lee Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in Global Security Issues: A Normative and
Institutional Critique, 14 MICH.J. INT'L L. 827, 839-40 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
264. See id. at 840 ("Experience has shown that formal State consensus over such broadly
worded human rights standards tells us little about the depth of actual State agreement about
such content."); Franck, Legitimacy, supra note 7, at 719 ("When determinacy is absent, it is
unlikely that states will have compunctions about not complying with the rule. Indeed, some
rules are probably written with low determinacy so that noncompliance will be easy.").
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fatal lack of determinacy.'f" At the same time, the treaties in question may
266describe norms not yet fully internalized within the international system.
The norms they describe may be primarily aspirational at this point.
6 7
Accession to such a treaty does not necessarily demonstrate a rule of
international law, and non-accession to such a treaty does not repudiate a
norm that may be in the process of being internalized even without a
treaty.
268
The contrasting reactions of authoritarian states and liberal
democracies to these treaties may demonstrate what is really going on. At
the same time that accession to a human rights treaty by a state that has no
intention of complying may show that the treaty rule does not yet have the
force of law, the myriad of RUDs and general unwillingness of liberal
democracies to join the treaty may indicate that the rule described within
the treaty has enough force and has been internalized enough to be taken
seriously.26 9 Hathaway's findings present an international law in flux, where
265. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination
& Prot. of Minorities, Minimum Humanitarian Standards: Analytical Report of the Secretary-General
submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/21, 66, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/87 (Jan. 5, 1998) (suggesting a "possible problem with the application of
existing human rights standards to situations of internal violence concerns the lack of specificity
of some of the most relevant rights and protections," and mentioning the ICCPR); see also
Donoho, supra note 263, passim (discussing potential indeterminacy in the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women and the ICCPR); Simpson, supra note 213, at 629 ("The incoherence
of free speech stems from the extremely open-textured and heavily qualified nature of the right
as laid out in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.").
266. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 258, at 491. As Kelly argues:
These broad social forces are transforming domestic attitudes about political rights
and women's rights, but there is little evidence that states have accepted the norms
associated with individualism and post-modem society as an international legal
obligation that limit their domestic choices. It is equally unclear how deeply the
attitude of individualism and rights consciousness are, in fact, penetrating these
societies beyond the economic elites.
Id. (citing RobertJ. Samuelson, Global Capitalism, R.LP. ?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1998, at 40).
267. I do not consider here the extent to which any individual treaty studied by Hathaway
may or may not reflect Internalized Norms or be backed by strong Process Values. Some of the
patterns she shows reflect only partial acceptance of a norm; others may simply reflect common
violation of a rule that is international law. Disaggregating these possibilities would take a very
careful study of the history and practice related to each treaty, work that is beyond the scope of
this Article. The hoped explanatory power of this revised doctrine of sources is not in
explaining all of Hathaway's findings but in providing an explanation for at least some-an
explanation that might better bridge the gap between law and action. Some gaps will and
should remain under any explanation; this theory is not intended to equate practice with law.
268. For example, see supra notes 152-80 and accompanying text, which describe the
Filartiga story.
269. Even if the treaties are backed by few Process Values, the norms they describe are
internalized enough that a liberal state may worry that the treaties will provide additional,
perhaps determinative, evidence of the rule, increasing the likelihood that those states wotld
be sanctioned for noncompliance. A second issue, hinted at here, is the domestic effect such
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various norms are in a constant process of being internalized and where
treaties provide a focal point, a mechanism, around which norms can
crystallize and be debated.
The new doctrine of sources described here would also do a better job
capturing the contours of these findings than two other alternative
formulations. One tempting alternative would be to leave the doctrine of
sources largely in place but to draw a distinction between human rights
treaties and everything else. Although such a distinction might explain some
of the gaps reflected by the system, it does not explain why human rights
treaties might be different. The revised doctrine of sources seeks to go
behind all treaties to see why they would or would not be binding. It tries to
find criteria that can be applied to any treaty. One can imagine human-
rights treaties backed by strong Process Values, as well as weak, vague
economic treaties. In such cases, the human rights treaty would be binding
law, but the economic treaty might not. Moreover, treaties do not appear in
the binary form of human rights or something else. Instead, treaties lie on a
spectrum, each containing fewer or more elements of state coordination
and individual rights. Treaties pertaining to humanitarian law, for example,
fall somewhere in the middle of this spectrum-on the one hand,
coordinating state behavior in war, and on the other hand, embodying
normative statements about, among other things, the treatment of captives
and the targeting of civilians. Environmental treaties may also contain
elements of each.
Another alternative formulation would keep the traditional doctrine of
sources in place but redefine "treaty" to include only those treaties backed
by strong Process Values. The effect of such a redefinition would be largely
the same as the new doctrine suggested here and would have the advantage
of doing less damage to current doctrine. The difference between this
alternative and the new doctrine described here might even be semantic. To
the extent that it is more than a semantic difference, however, such an
alternative provides only a piecemeal fix, tightening the definition of treaty
but leaving everything that falls outside treaty unexplained and
undifferentiated.
The redefinition of the term "treaty" also seems unlikely to remain
stable. To the extent that "treaty" remains the probative element, the
enhanced fit between identified law and observed practice is likely to be
temporary. The same pressures that created the current situation would
probably continue. Even in the shadow of a rule that only determinate
treaties count, the pressure to find agreement in the face of intractable
differences would likely lead to vaguer terms. States that fought for even
treaties would have in liberal states. Even in the absence of other Process Values, many liberal
states would consider these treaties binding as a matter of domestic law. This raises other issues
further discussed infra at note 282.
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such a weaker agreement would want to give their work legal imprimatur.
The desire to give legal foundation to additional human rights, rights that
may not yet be generally accepted, would put similar pressure on the
category of treaty to expand.
E. THE NEWDOCTRINE OF SOURCES IN PRACTICE
Perhaps the best way to understand the new doctrine of sources
proposed here is to look at the effect it would have on various aspects of
international law. This Section looks at how this new doctrine would affect
(1) international law theory, (2) disputes between states, (3) the direction of
state action, and (4) the legislation of new international rights. These are by
no means the only areas of international law that such a doctrine would
affect, and each of these areas is itself too complicated to be captured fully
here. But it is hoped that a quick look at these four areas will provide some
sense of how the doctrine would operate and the advantages and
disadvantages of adopting it.
1. The Effect of the New Doctrine of Sources on International Law Theory
Most of the discussion to this point has focused on the international law
theory, and it is in this area that a new doctrine of sources would have the
most positive impact. First and foremost, the new doctrine of sources would
alleviate some of the pressure created by gaps between the doctrinal
international law and the actual practice of states. 270 Observations like those
by Goldsmith and Posner and by Hathaway fuel skepticism about
international law.27' The widespread violation of certain high-profile rules of
international law casts a shadow over the rest of the field, feeding skepticism
of all international law, even those areas where international law is widely
followed. 2 72 "The collapse of legal rules through violation feeds upon itself,
creating a downward spiral and threatening the contagion of other legal
rules."2 73 The new doctrine of sources described here does not equate
270. See supra Part II.B.
271. See supra Part I.D.
272. This seems to be the case with Goldsmith and Posner, for whom examples of
noncompliance prove the absence of law, but examples of compliance are belittled as
pragmatic coordination by another name. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 120-29.
273. Glennon, supra note 90, at 956 ("Cycles of reinforcement lead to enhanced
cooperation, as evidenced by the deepening integration of the European Union; success breeds
success. But failure also breeds failure, and disintegration, further disintegration."); see also
David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organization: What Role for International Law?, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1104 (1998) ("To many people, international law is a weak
institution in international relations that usually promises more than it delivers."); Jed
Rubenfeld, Two World Orders, PROSPECT, Jan. 2004, at 36 ("A second spur to U.S. unilateralism
has been a growing scepticism about the agenda of the 'international legal community.' The
scepticism is partly due to the proliferation of human rights conventions that are systematically
violated by many of the states subscribing to them.").
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international law with the practice of states-some noncompliance should
be expected even under the new doctrine-but it does seek to bring the
definition of international law closer to what states treat as international
law.2 74 Such a shift refocuses attention away from the smaller area of
noncompliance toward the much larger area of compliance. Rather than
arguing over whether international law exists at all, scholars can focus on
which rules, which regimes, which threats and sanctions, lead to compliance
with international law. Such a focus on regime design seems considerably
more productive than the never-ending debate over international law's
existence.
Moreover, the new doctrine's focus on process and how rules come to
be treated as international law should also have a positive effect. Although
275
such a focus comes at the expense of clearer decision rules, it should
bring discussion of which rules constitute international law more in-line with
current scholarship on how international law works. Numerous scholars are
•• 276
currently studying the processes that lead to compliance; the new doctrine
of sources described here telescopes those ideas backwards to analyze which
rules are actually being treated as law in the international system. Placed in
this context, the work of those scholars may have an even greater impact,
providing the theoretical foundations for the legal nature of international
law.
2. The New Doctrine of Sources and International Dispute Resolution
The question remains: will what might work in theory work in practice?
Imagine a scenario in which State A accuses State B of violating international
274. This is an important distinction. Internalization of the fact that a rule is "law" is not
the same as choosing to obey the law. A state's belief that a rule is law affects that state's calculus
in deciding what actions to take. Breaking the law may bring particular consequences--the
reputation of being a law-breaker, specific legal sanctions, or even the psychological trauma of
knowing one broke the law-but there will be times, perhaps when national security is
endangered, when a state will decide that it must risk such consequences.
275. A rule stating that a certain source is international law provides a much simpler
decision rule than a rule that identifies the process through which international law forms.
276. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 10 (proposing a "managerial" model of
compliance that relies on repeated dialogues and interactions between states over rules);
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY, supra note 15 (arguing that state compliance with
international law results from perceived legitimacy of particular rules); Franck, Legitimacy, supra
note 7 (same); Goodman &Jinks, Socialization and International Human Rights Law, supra note 10
(suggesting that acculturation or socialization, rather than coercion or persuasion, may best
explain some state compliance); Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 6 (designing a
reputation-based model of state compliance with international law); Guzman, Saving Customary
International Law, supra note 135 (same); Hathaway, An Integrated Theory, supra note 4 (arguing
that state commitment to and compliance with treaties is a function of transnational and
domestic enforcement and collateral consequences); Koh, Bringing International Law Home,
supra note 7 (suggesting that states' compliance with international law results from
international law's rules' internalization into domestic legal systems); Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey?, supra note 14 (same).
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law. In the first instance, assume that the dispute ends up before a court or
tribunal.2 " If there is no treaty involved, the analysis under the new doctrine
would be much as it currently would be for a claim involving customary
international law. The court or tribunal would look for evidence of whether
or not the international community has come to treat the rule in question as
a rule of international law. The one main difference from current doctrine
is that opinio juris, or norm internalization, would be the central inquiry. As
Andrew Guzman has suggested in his discussion of a reputation-based theory
of customary international law, once opinio juris becomes the central
278concern, the old requirement of consistent state practice drops away.
Custom is useful as evidence of opinio juris--consistent state practice may
demonstrate that the norm has been internalized 279 -but so too are
statements of state officials, non-binding declarations, and domestic-court
decisions. Essentially, this allows for the possibility of "instant custom,"
customary international law found without much evidence of consistent
2810 281practice. Courts have already started to deploy such techniques; the new
doctrine simply explains why they are theoretically legitimate.
If a treaty (one that State B has ratified) is involved in the dispute, the
analysis is more complicated. The first question will be whether the treaty
involved is a Legitimated Treaty-whether the treaty has become law
through legitimate process. The court or tribunal will look at the treaty's
pedigree, the determinacy of the rules, the seriousness of the process of
treaty negotiation and ratification, and evidence that the parties intended or
282should have expected to be bound. The question is not what State B
277. This discussion applies to a court or tribunal applying international rather than
domestic law. The situation would be different if it involved a U.S. court analyzing U.S.
obligations under a treaty the United States had ratified. Under those circumstances, the treaty
would be binding U.S. law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and would be
applied to the dispute. None of the analysis suggested here would be necessary.
278. See Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, supra note 135, at 149-57 ("If states as
a group believe there is a legal obligation, this is enough to generate reputational (and perhaps
direct) sanctions. The question of practice is not directly relevant to the issue.").
279. Id. at 149.
280. Id. at 157-59.
281. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758 (2001) (citing Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27);
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 30-37 (Oct. 16); and Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31-
32 (June 21)).
282. One particularly difficult question raised by the new doctrine of sources is whether
different states, by following different paths to ratification of a treaty, may demonstrate
different intent to be bound. For example, treaties apply as the law of the land under the U.S.
Constitution. Senate approval is also required for ratification. As a result of both, the United
States cannot ratify a treaty without investing considerable political capital and without
expecting to be bound. If the United States enters into a treaty with a state that does not have
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thought it was doing when it ratified the treaty, but what other states would
expect of State B given the circumstances. The question is an objective one:
whether the process followed by State B would have led other states (some
consensus thereof)2 8 3 to believe it was bound and whether other states would
have considered a breach by State B to be sanctionable or worthy of rebuke.
If the treaty, or the provision in question, meets these standards of
legitimacy, State B will be held bound by its obligations and the treaty will be
analyzed to decide the dispute just as it would under current doctrine. As
explained above, 8 4 many treaties involve ordinary attempts at state
coordination in areas of trade, investment, or international standards. These
treaties will ordinarily be backed by legitimate process and, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, can be presumed to be Legitimated Treaties
constituting international law for the ratifying parties.
If, however, the treaty provision seems too vague, or the process behind
it too thin to be treated as law in and of itself, the court or tribunal will
instead turn to the analysis it would perform in the absence of a treaty,
searching instead for evidence of internalized norms and opinio juris. The
one distinction is that in this case the treaty in question would provide a
focal point around which to center the investigation and would provide at
least some evidence from which to work.
Most international disputes, however, are not decided by a court or a
285tribunal, but by the court of public opinion. In these cases, the new
doctrine does little to change what actually happens in practice. In those
cases, State A and State B consider whether other states believe State B to
have violated international law and whether other states would consider
State B's actions worthy of sanction. State B will want to know what sanctions
such mechanisms in place and other Process Values are not followed in negotiating the treaty,
one could argue that the treaty is binding international law for the United States but not
binding on the other state. Others have suggested ways in which the nature of a state may
determine its place within the international community-distinguishing, for example, between
the international law applicable to liberal and illiberal states. See generally JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW
OF PEOPLES (1999); FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALIT'Y (3rd ed. 2005); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992). Would the new
doctrine of sources necessitate such a view? This issue remains one of the most difficult raised
by the discussion and requires further consideration.
283. Of course, the identity of the other states does matter. Different groups of states may
view the international system, its rules, even law-abidingness, differently. There may be reasons
to think about a state's audience for specific actions. For the purposes of this Article though, it is
sufficient to speak in terms of the views of all other states considered together.
284. See supra Parts IV.B.2, IV.C.2.
285. See Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, supra note 135, at 134 ("The
international system, however, does not provide ... a set of courts ready to resolve interstate
disputes. Since violations of [customary international law] do not lead to court-imposed
sanctions, law can only affect behavior if there is some other sanction associated with
noncompliance.").
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it can expect from State A or anyone else. Aside from worrying about direct
sanctions, it will want to know whether continued violation of the rule in
question will jeopardize its reputation for law-abidingness and its ability to
make agreements with other states. State A will want to know whether its
actions in response to the violation will be seen as lawful for the same
reason. Tacitly, State A, State B, and all observing states will be determining
whether there is a Legitimated Treaty or whether an internalized norm has
been broken.
Under the current doctrine, this analysis can lead to considerable
hypocrisy as states decide which laws matter to them rather than whether
laws have actually been violated. The main effect of the new doctrine of
sources would be to bring assessments of whether the law has been broken
closer to assessments of whether State B's actions are sanctionable. Such a
shift, by eliminating some of the distinction between law on the books and
law that matters, might engender greater respect for international law.
3. The Doctrine of Sources and the Direction of State Action
States and those advising them turn to the doctrine of sources to
determine the rules governing their actions and the limits on their choices.
At first glance, the new doctrine of sources suggested here appears to make
that task more difficult. Treaties would no longer provide the clear answers
they did before; it might be harder to say with certainty what international
law requires. As a practical matter, however, the changes may not be so
286dramatic. Particularly in the case of treaties involving vague rules,
assessments of the law are already uncertain. In determining what a vague
treaty requires, a state considers not just the language of the treaty, but also
international consensus on the issue: what actions might be allowed,
forbidden, or accepted by the international community. For at least some,
what the "law" requires is only the first part of the analysis, followed by an
assessment of the effects of violation.
The new doctrine of sources would simply shift the line of inquiry. The
subtle analyses now required to determine a rule's application and scope
would now be part of the initial inquiry into what the law requires. Under
the new doctrine of sources, assessing the law would require understanding
the process of norm internalization. 28 7 Instead of describing an international
law rule with intermittent or uncertain support, the new doctrine might
suggest a law in the process of coalescing (or perhaps degrading).
Such a shift in focus, even if only rhetorical, could prove beneficial for
international law. Under the current doctrine, an international lawyer is put
in the awkward position of advising that the law clearly requires or forbids a
286. A treaty with determinate rules, if backed by other Process Values, should provide as
much certainty as any treaty did under the old doctrine of sources.
287. See supra Part IV.C. For potential examples, see supra note 265.
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certain action but that violation of that law will be met with indifference.
Such advice can only diminish respect for international law. By
incorporating international consensus into assessments of what the law
requires, the new doctrine of sources would help alleviate this problem. The
distinction between what the law requires and what states care about would
shrink.
The new doctrine would also encourage both those advising states and
those acting on a state's behalf to see their actions as part of the process of
international law-making. Where the law on an issue is still only crystallizing,
a state will have to consider the effect its actions will have on how that law
develops. A violation of the nascent rule might be ignored, but it might also
serve as the trigger that finally galvanizes support for the rule and for
sanctioning the offending state. In some cases, the opposite could happen,
and the violation could trigger the unraveling of an already weak rule.
International lawyers and state actors will have to consider such
218possibilities.
4. The Legislation of New International Rights
The new doctrine of sources should also help clarify the choices
confronting international law advocates. The effects of a new treaty
enshrining new rights will have to be considered carefully. Where consensus
is strong and a treaty backed by strong Process Values is possible, the new
treaty can become a powerful tool in advancing those rights. Enshrined in a
Legitimated Treaty, the new right would be part of international law. Where
Process Values and consensus are lacking, the treaty may not yet be
international law. Nonetheless, such a treaty can provide a powerful focal
point for the internalization of a new norm.
But such a treaty can also overreach, outstripping any international
agreement on the issue. When that happens, the rights involved may remain
nothing more than Aspirational International Law. Such a treaty may even
have the opposite effect, giving the title of "law" and "treaty" to something
widely ignored. The result of too many such treaties may be a diminishing
respect for both those terms.
The new doctrine of sources does not tell international legislators how
to navigate between these difficult poles, and it is unclear whether adopting
such a doctrine would lead to more or fewer treaties. The possibility that a
treaty might be ignored where Process Values are absent may lead some to
conclude that treaty negotiations are not worth the trouble. Others may
decide that committing crystallizing international norms to writing is an
additional step toward norm internalization well worth the effort. The new
doctrine clarifies the stakes attached to these choices and the work necessary
288. Sophisticated lawyers likely approximate such advice even under current doctrine.
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to give a treaty legal effect, either in making sure Process Values are satisfied
in negotiating the treaty or in helping internalize its rules after it is signed.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of sources has played an important role in the
development of international law over the last century.!' It has provided a
relatively simple, easy-to-apply method to determine what international law
requires. Increasingly, however, the rules identified by that easy-to-apply
method seem divorced from the actual practice of states.290 Accession to
treaties requiring civil and political rights seem to have had little impact on
repressive regimes like Syria, North Korea, and Zimbabwe. At the same time,
new sources-U.N. Declarations and "instant custom"-seem to capture
aspects of international law invisible to the traditional doctrine of sources.' 9'
This inaccuracy is not just a technical problem. To international law
skeptics, the gaps between what international law is said to require and what
states actually do is proof that international law is a myth, a rhetorical device,
or wishful thinking.292 As the number of visible violations grows and the gaps
between treaty obligation and state practice seem to widen, international law
appears increasingly irrelevant. As Jack Straw has observed, "If you have a set
of rules which conflict with reality, then reality normally wins."
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The new doctrine of sources described in this Article sacrifices some of
the simplicity and certainty of the traditional doctrine of sources. In their
place, however, it seeks to offer improved accuracy-a better picture of the
international law actually governing the international system. By focusing on
internalized norms underlying the international system and the process
through which states come to treat rules as international law, the new
doctrine suggested here may better capture the real force of international
law. This new doctrine of sources may suggest an international law that is
less broad than that suggested by some international law advocates. Some of
the often-violated rules referred to by international law skeptics may not
actually be international law. But by focusing on how rules are internalized
by international actors, this new doctrine also suggests a deeper, more
powerful understanding of international law than is often discussed.
Conceived this way, international law can and truly does shape state action.
289. See supra Parts IA-B.
290. See supra Part II.D.
291. See supra Part II.B.
292. See supra Part II.B.
293. George Parker, EU Pact Dispute Blights Foreign Minister Meeting, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 28, 2003, at 6.
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